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Analysis of the Electrical Distribution and Control/




The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the Space Transportation
System (STS) Orbiter and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in National Space
Transportation System (NSTS) 22206, Instruc_'fo____[ Preparation
of FMEA and CIL, I0 October 1986.
The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the Electrical
Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C)/Remote Manipulator
System (RMS) hardware to determine failure modes, criticality,
and potential critical items, To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained in the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report
documents (Appendix C) the results of the independent analysis
of the EPD&C/RMS (both port and starboard) hardware.
The EPD&C/RMS subsystem hardware provides the electrical power
and power control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate,
control, and stow or guillotine and Jettison two (one port and
one starboard) RMSs. The EPD&C/RMS subsystem is subdivided
into the four following functional divisions:
o Remote Manipulator Arm
o Manipulator Deploy Control
o Manipulator Latch Control
o Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison
and Retention Arm Jettison
The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD&C/RMS hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based on the severity of the effect for
each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the four subdivisions of the EPD&C/RMS subsystem. A summary
of the number of failure modes, by criticality combination, is also
presented below with Hardware (HW) criticality on the left of the
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
-+





















The STS-51L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) hardware identified in the Space Shuttle
Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment Contractor Statement of Work.
Each subsystem analysis addresses hardware, functions, internal




















The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.






Define subsystem specific ground rules
and assumptions






Define detailed subsystems representations
Step 3.0 Define Failure Events
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results








Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The EPD&C/RMS specific ground rules and assumptions used in the
IOA are defined in Appendix B.
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2.5 Analysis Subsystem Interfacing Identification Coding
In order to provide for ease of cross-referencing and comparisons
of subsystems, the analysis of the EPD&C/RMSsubsystem is further
subdivided into the four separate subdivisions that comply with the
EPD&C/Interfacing Subsystem Identifiers defined in Tables 4.0 and
5.0, Rockwell International Space Division Reliability Desk
Instruction No. 100-2G, Fli@ht Hardware Failure Mode Effects
Analysis (FMEA) & Critical Items List (CIL), date--a January 31,
1984.
The EPD&C/RMS subsystem interfacing identifiers and subdivision




Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C)
Remote Manipulator Arm
Manipulator Deploy Control
05-61C Manipulator Latch Control
05-6ID Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison



















3.1 Design and Function
The EPD&C/RMS subsystem provides the electrical power and power
control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate, control,
and stow one port and one starboard RMS. The EPD&C/RMS is a
subset of the Orbiter EPD&C subsystem and uses the same three
main busses and the same type of distribution and control
hardware that is used to supply electrical power to the rest of
the space shuttle subsystems• In addition, electrical power and
control circuitry is provided to guillotine the appropriate
cabling and Jettison either or both the remote manipulator arms
in the event it becomes necessary for crew/vehicle safety.
Although the EPD&C/RMS subsystem is designed to supply the
required electrical power to both a port and a starboard RMS on a
given mission, only one RMS can be powered-on at a given time.
The port and starboard RMSs are essentially mirror images of one
another. Some of the EPD&C/RMS electrical power control
switches are common to both the port and starboard systems and
some switches are dedicated to one or the other RMS. The port
and starboard EPD&C/RMS subsystems are essentially identical in
design. The port and starboard systems do differ in that power
and control bus assignments are not the same for both systems.
The EPD&C/RMS subsystem consists of the following subdivisions:
l , The EPD&C/RMS Remote Manipulator Arm (05-6IA)
subdivision consists of the hardware to provide
Main Bus 28 volts Direct Current (DC) and 115 volts,
three-phase (3-PH) and single-phase (I-PH), 400 Hertz
(Hz) Alternating Current (AC) primary and backup
(standby redundant) power to both the port and starboard
(only one at a time) Remote Manipulator Arms for
operation of its control electronics, heaters, lights
and drive motors.
• The EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Deploy Control (05-6IB)
subdivision consists of the hardware to provide
Main Bus 28 volts DC and 115 volts, 3-phase (3-PH),
400 Hz AC power to the Motor Control Assemblies (MCAs)
to control power to the two electrical motors that drive
the actuator to physically drive the appropriate
Manipulator Positioning Mechanism (MPM) to stow or
deploy the port and starboard Remote Manipulator Arms.
7
,•
The EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Latch Control (05-6IC)
subdivision consists of the hardware to provide
Main Bus 28 volts DC and 115 volts, 3-phase (3-PH),
400 Hz AC power to the MCAs to control power to the
three sets of electrical motor pairs that drive the
retention latch actuators to release or latch position.
There are three retention latch mechanisms with one
located at each of the forward, mid, and aft positions
for the port arm and another set for the starboard arm.
The EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison and
Retention Arm Jettison (0S-6ID) SuSdivisi0n consists of
the hardware to provide the 28 volts DC and control
switching to safely arm and fire the Pyro Initiator
Controllers (PICs) that enable detonation of the
explosives to guillotine the necessary RMS cables and
jettison either or both the port and/or starboard arms
if it becomes necessary for crew/vehicle safety.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The remote manipulator arm is attached to the Orbiter longeron
(port, starboard, or both) through a roll-out deployment
mechanism. The RMS is operated by a crewmember using direct
viewing and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) from the Display
and Control (D&C) station on the aft flight deck. Most of the
EPD&C/RMS switches are located on panels ASA2 and AI4. The
Payload Bay Mechanical (PLBM) power switches that control the
power to the Motor Control Assemblies are located on panel RI3AI
in the cockpit and the circuit breakers are located on the
standard circuit breaker panels•
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the EPD&C/RMS and the
corresponding subdivisions. The subdivisions are represented in
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Figure 6 - EPD&C/RMS MANIPULATOR ARM SHOULDER JETTISON
AND RETENTION ARM JETTISON (05-6ID)
15
4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the four major subdivisions
of the RMS/EPD&C. Further discussions of each of the subdivisions




















































Of the three hundred and forty-five (345) failure modes analyzed,
twenty-three (23) single failures were determined to result in
possible loss of crew or vehicle, and fifteen (15) Were
determined to result in loss of mission. A summary of the
potential critical items is presented in Table II. Appendix D
presents a cross reference between each Potential Critical Item
























4.1 Analysis Results - Remote Manipulator Arm (05-6IA)
The EPD&C/RMS Remote Manipulator Arm subdivision provides the DC
and AC electrical power to the port and the starboard systems for
operation of the control electronics, heaters, lights and drive
motors. There are forty-eight (48) failure modes identified for
this subdivision. Of these, three (3) are Criticality i/i;
fifteen (15) are Criticality 2/IR; thirteen (13) are Criticality










4.2 Analysis Result - Manipulator Deploy Control (05-6IB)
The EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Deploy Control-subdivision provides the
DC and AC electrical power to the port and the starboard systems
for control and operation of the Manipulator Positioning
Mechanisms to stow and deploy the respective arms. There are
seventy-four (74) failure modes identified for this division. Of
these, ten (I0) are Criticality I/i; tWO (2) are Criticality
2/IR; two (2) are Criticality 2/2; thirty (30) are Criticality
3/2R; and thirty (30) are Criticality 3/3.
4.3 Analysis Results - Manipulator Latch Control (05-6IC)
The EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Latch Control subdivision provides the
DC and AC electrical power to the port and the starboard systems
for control and operation of the retention latch actuators
to latch and release the respective forward, mid and aft
retention latch mechanisms. There are one hundred and forty-four
(144) failure modes identified for this division. Of these,
seventy (70) are Criticality 3/2R; and seventy-four (74) are
Criticality 3/3.
4.4 Analysis Results - Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison and
Retention Arm Jettison (05-6ID)
The EPD&C/RMS Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison and Retention
Arm Jettison (05-6ID) subdivision provides the 28 volts DC and
control switching to safely arm and fire the Pyro Initiator
Controllers (PICs) that enable the detonation of the explosives
to guillotine the necessary RMS cables and Jettison either or
both the port or starboard arms if it becomes necessary for
crew/vehicle safety. There are seventy-nine (79) failure modes
identified for this division. Of these, ten (i0) are Criticality
i/i; sixty-two are (62) Criticality 2/IR; one is Criticality




Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell
International Space Division was used in the analysis•
The documentation used in the analysis includes the following:
i. NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL), Oct. i0, 1986
• JSC-IlI74, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Rev. C,
DCN-5, Sep. 13, 1985
•
4.
VS72-956099, Rockwell International Electrical
Schematics Remote Manipulator System
Rockwell, International Space Division Reliability
Desk Instruction No. 100-2G, Flight Hardware Failure
Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) & Critical Items List




























































- Abort Once Around
- Ampere
- Abort To Orbit
- Circuit Breaker




- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Forward Motor Controller
- Failure Mode Effects Analysis







- Hertz (cycles per second)
- Independent Orbiter Analysis
- Jettison
- Limiting
- Manipulator Controller Interface Unit
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Manned Foot Restraint
- Mid Motor Controller
- Main 28 VDC Power Bus
- Mid Power Controller
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration






















ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS (Cont' d)
- Pass
- Payload Bay Mechanical
- Power Controller Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Phase
- Pyro Initiator Controller
- Position
- Pyrotechnic
- Remote Manipulator System
- Remote Power Controller
- Return To Launch Site
- Starboard
- TransAtlantic Abort Landing
- volts Alternating Current































Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions








DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1386, were used with the _lowing
_plifications and additl_-_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_-_ OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard _function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p-l-_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and






























MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or eve-_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up an-_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transiti_ out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins,at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at _ra-_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en-_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear






DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
g
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for









The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
































All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to




DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
I
B.3 EPD&C/RMS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component level wherever
it was deemed appropriate and the components were identifiable on
the drawings. The analysis was performed to the assembly level
for those assemblies that are common to general EPD&C usage.
The analysis considered the worst case effects of the hardware or
functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and crew and
vehicle safety•
1. Component age life was not considered in the analysis.
RATIONALE: Component age analysis is beyond the
scope of this task.
2. ARMS mission is considered to be uncradling, grappling
a berthed payload, unberthlng it, deploying it, and then
retrieving a rotating payload, reberthing it, and
performing Manned Foot Restraint (MFR) operations. Any
failure that prevents the completion of any of these
tasks is considered to be loss of mission•
RATIONALE: This is the most demanding RMS mission
possible. This causes the worst case
criticalities for certain failures
because they will prevent completion
of this mission.
• Any failure that causes uncommanded motion of any part
of the RMS will be considered to be the highest
criticality until it is definitely established that
there is no time at which the given uncommandedmotion
would be of no consequence or absolutely could not
occur•
RATIONALE: Uncommanded motion_in its worst case
could possibly cause physical damage
































The loss of primary power causes loss of primary
mode of operation of the RMS, which will cause loss of
mission.
RATIONALE: Backup RMS power is standby redundant
and provides for safe release of the
payload and cradling the arm for some
failures. Therefore, loss of primary
power is considered to be Criticality
2 even though backup power is
available since loss of primary power
causes loss of primary mode of
operation of a RMS.
EPD&C/RMS failures are only considered for the on-orbit
phase.
RATIONALE: During ascent, entry, and aborts the
RMS is latched and unpowered.
Inadvertent power application to the
retention latch mechanism or
stow/deploy actuator motors would
require multiple failure combinations
which is beyond the scope of this
analysis• Prelaunch failures are not
included as part of the EPD&C/RMS
analysis since failures that could
occur during prelaunch would be
general EPD&C and are covered in that
analysis•
Failure modes for port and starboard arms were analyzed
as individual failures and no consideration was given to
any provision of redundancy that could exist on a two
RMS mission•
RATIONALE: The individual analysis was done to
ensure that, indeed, the port and
starboard RMS were similar• There are
differences, however, in remote power
control and power bus assignments that
































This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and the
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effect_ are entered at--Ehe
5-5-Etom of each sheet_-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
w
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 _ Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA - Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P - Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen









FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF POSITION.
L ADANALY  :  O I  ON SUBSYSLE D:  CHMEen EPER





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 36 V 73A8A2 S 4
PART _MBER: ME452-0102-7403
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROS ION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE EITHER PRIMARY OR BAC_ 28 VDC AND
115 VACPOWE_ TO E_THERTHE PORT OR ST_'__E_PULATORARM.
INABILITY TO PROVIDE ELECTRICAL POWER TO THE RMS NEGATES ITS
USE FOR MISSION FUNCTIONS. LOSS OF MISSION RESULTS.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






































CONTACTS SHORT TO GROUND WHILE RMS IS IN USE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ASA2
4) RMS POWER SWITCH, PRIMARY/OFF/BACKUP
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE EITHER PRIMARY OR BACKUP 28 VDC AND
115 VAC POWER TO EITHER THE PORT OR STBD REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
LOSS OF POWER TO AN RMS IN USE COULD REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE
RMS IF SAFE JETTISON IS AN OPTION. IF THE RMS CANNOT BE SAFELY
JETTISONED, LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL A8A2
4) RMS POWER SWITCH, PRIMARY/OFF/BACKUP
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73A8A2S4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION _i_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE PRIMARY 28VDC AND 115 VAC POWER TO
EITHER THE PORT OR STBD REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
LOSS OF PRIMARY POWER RESULTS IN LOSS OF PRIME MODE OF
OPERATION OF THE RMS. THE ARM CAN BE SAFELY STOWED WITH BACKUP
POWER. LOSS OF USE OF THE RMS RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROC_ELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





































FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH BACKUP POWER ON.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ASA2
4) RMS POWER SWITCH, PRIMARY/OFF/BACKUP
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73ASA2 $4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE BACKUP 28VDC POWER TO THE REMOTE
MANIPULATOR ARM. BACKUP POWER TO THE RMS IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
BACKUP POWER IS REQUIRED TO POSITION AND STOW THE ARM IN THE
EVENT OF FAILURE OF PRIMARY POWER SYSTEM. WITH NO POWER
REDUNDANCY AVAILABLE, THE ARM COULD NOT SAFELY BE USED TO FULFILL
MISSION REQUIREMENTS, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-5
INDEP_ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: PRIMARY POWER FAILS OPEN WHILE ARM IS IN USE.






























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 36V73A8A2S4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0i02-7403
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF PRIMARY 28VDC AND 115 VAC POWER TO THE RMS. BACKUP
POWER TO THE RMS IS STANDBY REDUNDANT. _--_
IF LOSS OF PRIMARY POWER OCCURRED AT A TIME WHEN THE ARM WAS IN
A POSITION SUCH THAT IT COULD NOT BE SAFELY JETTISONED, A
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE BACKUP POWER SYSTEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW. .......
REFERENCES: VS72=956099, ROC_LL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

















REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-6
w
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FAILS CLOSED IN PRIMARY POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL A8A2
4) RMS POWER SWITCH, PRIMARY/OFF/BACKUP
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO POWER DOWN THE RMS WITH THE POWER SWITCH.
NO EFFECT. PRIMARY POWER TO THE CIRCUIT COULD BE INTERRUPTED
USING SWITCH S1 (MN A) AND CIRCUIT BREAKER CBI7 (ACI).
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS














FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ASA2
4) RMS SE_CT SWITCH, PORT/OFF/STBD
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 36V73A8A2 S 1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION .........
......_FFECTS/RATIONA_:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE EITHER 28 VDC __OR_BkCKTJp:_ __
POWER TO EI__ STBD REMOTE m_U_O"U_TOR ARMS. TH_ 'RMS
SELECT' SWITCH (SI) IS A SINGLE POINT FAILURE ITEM.
LOSS OF USE OF THE I_MS TO FULFILL MISION REQUIREMENTS, THUS
LOSS OF MISSION.
__NCES: VS72"956099_, R6t_LL E_CTRICAL_SCHEMATIC, RMS


































CONTACTS SHORTS TO GROUND WHILE RMS IS IN USE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ASA2
4) RMS SELECT SWITCH, PORT/OFF/STBD
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE EITHER 28 VDC PRIMARY OR BACKUP
POWER TO THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM BEING USED (AND ALSO THE
OTHER ARM). THE 'RMS SELECT' SWITCH (SI) IS A SINGLE POINT
FAILURE ITEM.
LOSS OF POWER TO AN RMS IN USE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF ARM IN USE CANNOT BE STOWED OR
SAFELY JETTISIONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-9
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4009 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCH, S1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN WHILE EITHER ARM IS IN USE.






2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL A8A2
4) RMS SELECT SWITCH, PORT/OFF/STBD
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BOTH PRIMARY AND SECONDARY POWER TO THE REMOTE
MANIPULATOR ARM BEING USED.
LOSS OF BOTH PRIMARY AND BACKUP POWER TO THE RMS WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION AND POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF THE ARM IN
USE CANNOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROC_LL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






































FAILS OFF WHILE ARM IS IN USE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ABA2
4) PORT RMS HEATER A, AUTO/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL RPC 27 IN MPCI TO ENABLE THE PORT
RMS MN A 28 VDC HEATER BUS.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE PORT RMS HEATER SYSTEM B COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MANIPULATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY, WHICH COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION AND POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF ARM
COULD NOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISONED.
w
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-ll174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK













FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF WHILE ARM IS IN USE.



















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL RPC 28 IN MPC2 TO ENABLE THE PORT
RMS MN B 28 VDC HEATER BUS.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE PORT RMS HEATER SYSTEM A COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MANIPULATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY, WHICH COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION AND POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF ARM
COULD NOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISONED'
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






































FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO AUTO POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ASA2
4) PORT RMS HEATERS A & B, AUTO/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED
6) SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POSITION, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BE ] cC ]
LOCATION: 36V73A8A2S8, $10
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ENABLE AUTO CONTROL OF EITHER OR BOTH PORT
RMS HEATER BUS POWER SYSTEMS A/B.
BOTH HEATER SYSTEMS A & BARE THERMOSTATICALLY CONTROLLED AND
ARE NOMINALLY USED WITH BOTH IN THE AUTO POSITION WHILE OPERATING
THE ARM. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IN THE HEATER SYSTEMS WOULD PRECLUDE
OPERATION OF THE ARM THUS RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
v
b
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL A8A2
4) STBD RMS HEATER A, AUTO/OFF ....
S) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED .....




















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL RPC 26 IN MPCl TO ENABLE THE STBD
RMS MN A 28 VDC HEATER BUS.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE STBD RMS HEATER SYSTEM B COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MANIPULATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY, WHICH COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION AND POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF ARM















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
I
B





















FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO AUTO POSITION.



















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL RPC 29 IN MPC2 TO ENABLE THE STBD
RMS MN B 28 VDC HEATER BUS.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE STBD RMS HEATER SYSTEM A COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MANIPULATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY, WHICH COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION AND POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE IF ARM COULD
NOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
L
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/31/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4015 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCHES, $7, $9
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH FROM AUTO TO OFF POSITION.






2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL A8A2
4) STBD RMS HEATER A & B, AUTO/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED
6) SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POSITION, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ENABLE AUTO CONTROL OF EITHER OR BOTH THE
STBD RMS HEATER SYSTEMS A/B.
BOTH HEATER SYSTEMS A & BARE THERMOSTATICALLY CONTROLLED AND
ARE NOMINALLY USED IN THE AUTO POSITION WHILE OPERATING THE ARM.
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IN THE HEATER SYSTEMS WOULD PRECLUDE OPERATION

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-16
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FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO ARM DEPLOYMENT.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ASA2
4) RMS POWER SWITCH, $4
5) PRIMARY SWITCH POSITION, (MN A) FUSE





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE PRIMARY (28 VDC MNA) POWER TO
EITHER REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM, THE MCIU, OR LOAD PANEL A8AI.
BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF PRIMARY POWER WOULD NEGATE USE OF RMS TO FULFILL
MISSION REQUIREMENTS. LOSS OF MISSION RESULTS.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS














FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN WHILE ARM IS IN USE.
=
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
!) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL A8A2
4) RMS PO_R SWITCH, $4
5) PRIMARY SWITCH POSITION,






FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ..... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/iR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 36V73ASA2F1
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0200
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION_ CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE PRIMARY (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO
EITHER _M6TE MA_ULATOR _M, THE MCIU, OR LOAD PANEL ASAI,
BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE BACKUP POWER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-IIi74, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK mm
m
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FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO ARM DEPLOYMENT,




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBI T: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE BACKUP (28 VDC MN B) POWER TO EITHER
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM. BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF BACKUP POWER PRIOR TO DEPLOYMANT WOULD NEGATE THE USE
OF THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM TO FULFILL MISSION REQUIREMENTS,
THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-19
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FAILS OPEN WHILE ARM IS IN USE.













RMS POWER SWITCH, $4




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE BACKUP (28 VDC MN B) POWER TO EITHER
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM. BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
BACKUP POWER WOULD ONLY BEMUSED AFTER PRIMARY FAILURE OCCURRED
WHILE IN USE. LOSS OF BACKUP POWER WHILE REMOTE MANIPULATOR IS
USING BACKUP POWER COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF ARM

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
I
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2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ASA2
4) SWITCH, PORT HEATER A, $8
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2 WATT
RESISTOR, A3R2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C P ] C C P ]
LOCATION: 36V73A8A2A3R2
PART NUMBER: RLR4201201GM
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ENABLE RPC 27 (MPC 1, MN A) TO PROVIDE AUTO
HEATER A POWER TO PORT REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN HEATER SYSTEM B COULD CAUSE LOSS OF





REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





















SWIT_H_PORT _ATER B, S!0
RESISTOR, C_ENT LIMITING
















A [ ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73A8A2A3R3 _:-;_:_:_ _ .
PART N_JMBER: RLR4201201GM
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION i
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
I__SSgF=ABI=LITYTO_ENABLE RPC28o(MPC2, MNB) T0 PROVIDE AUTO
HEATER B POWER TO PORT REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN HEATER SYSTEM A COULD CAUSE LOSS OF


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROC_LL E_CTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS _
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK mm


















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ASA2
4) SWITCH, STBD HEATER A, $7
5) RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING





















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ENABLE RPC 26 (MPC i, MN A) TO PROVIDE AUTO
HEATER A POWER TO STBD REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN HEATER SYSTEM B COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MANIPULATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY, THUS LOSS OF MISSION COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL A8A2
4) SWITCH, STBD HEATER B, $9
5) RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING






















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 36V73A8A2A2R3
PART NUMBER: RLR4201201GM
] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ENABLE RPC 29 (MPC 2, MN B) TO PROVIDE AUTO
HEATER B POWER TO STBD REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN HEATER SYSTEM A COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MANIPULATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY, THUS LOSS OF MISSION COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ASA2
4) RMS POWER SWITCH SCAN CIRCUIT, MDM OF4
S) PRIMARY POWER ON/OFF (V54S06000E)
6) RESISTOR, ISOLATION




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 36V73A8A2AIRI
PART NUMBER: RLR0705101GR
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCH SCAN MEASUREMENT. THE 'RMS PRIMARY POWER ON'
MEASUREMENT (V54S0600E) TO MDM OF4 WILL ALWAYS INDICATE 'OFF'.
MEASUREMENT NOT CRITICAL TO OPERATION OF SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-25
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FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL ASA2
4) RMS POWER SWITCH SCAN CIRCUIT, MDM OF4
5) BACKUP POWER ON/OFF (V54SO6001E_
6) RESISTOR, ISOLATION





















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCH SCAN MEASUREMENT. THE 'RMS BACKUP POWER ON'
MEASUREMENT (V54S0601E) TO MDM OF4 WILL ALWAYS INDICATE 'OFF'.
MEASUREMENT NOT CRITICAL TO OPERATION OF SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PANEL A8A2
4) RMS HEATER POWER SWITCH SCAN CIRCUIT, MDM OF4
5) PORT HEATER A POWER AUTO/OFF (V54S0760E)
6) RESISTOR, ISOLATION




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCH SCAN MEASUREMENT. THE 'PORT RMS HEATER A POWER
AUTO' MEASUREMENT (V54S0760E) TO MDM OF4 WILL ALWAYS INDICATE
'OFF'.
MEASUREMENT NOT CRITICAL TO OPERATION OF SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

































RMS HEATER POWER SWITCH SCAN CIRCUIT, MDM OF4 ......
STBD FB_A_ A POWER_.U-TOTO_F (V54S0960_ _ _;_
RESISTOR, ISOLATION
RESISTOR, 5.1K OH, 1/4 WATT
RESISTOR, A2RI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO : /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCH SCAN MEASUREMENT. THE 'STBD RMS HEATER A POWER
AUTO i MEASUREMENT (V54S0760E) TO MDM OF4 WILL AL-W-AYS INDICATE
'OFF'.
MEASUREMENT NOT CRITICAL TO OPERATION OF SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 4028 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO ARM DEPLOYMENT.














AC SYSTEM 1 POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER, I-PH, 3 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE PRIMARYAC POWER (SYSTEM i) TO THE
RMS LOAD PANEL A8AI PRIMARY POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT. BACKUP POWER
IS STANDBBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF PRIMARY POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER WOULD NEGATE USE OF
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD RESULT.
_r
u
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK






























AC SYSTEM 1 POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER, I-PH, 3 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT : 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO : /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CBI7 .....
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE PRIMARYAC POWER (SYSTEM i) TO THE
RMS LOAD PANEL A8AI PRIMARY POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT. BACKUP POWER
IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF PRIMARY AC POWER WHILE ARM IS IN USE WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF PRIMARY MODE OF OPERATION, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. ANY
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN BACKUP SYSTEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW IF ARM COULD NOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS



































ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.














AC SYSTEM 1 POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER, I-PH, 3 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR LOAD PANEL
A8AI AC POWER SYSTEM 1 POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT. POWER CAN BE
REMOVED BY SWITCH.
CIRCUIT BREAKER IS NORMALLY CLOSED THUS THE FAILURE COULD
REMAIN UNDETECTED UNTIL POWERDOWN OF CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF ARM.

















AC SYSTEM 2 POWER




















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE BACKUP AC POWER (SYSTEM 2) TO THE
RMS LOAD PANEL ASAI BACKUP POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT. BACKUP AC
POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF BACKUP POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT WOULD NEGATE USE OF REMOTE















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK l "
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-32
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS OPEN WHILE ARM IS IN USE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IA









AC SYSTEM 2 POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 1-PH, 3 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB19
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CBI9
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE BACKUP AC POWER (SYSTEM 2) TO THE
RMS LOAD PANEL A8AI BACKUP POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT. BACKUP AC
POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF BACKUP AC POWER WHILE ARM IS IN USE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
BACKUP MODE OF OPERATION WHICH SHOULD ABORT THE MISSION. ANY
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN PRIMARY SYSTEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW IF ARM CANNOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-33
INDEPENDENT O_BITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4033 ABORT:
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI9
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.

















AC SYSTEM 2 POWER
CIRCUIT BREAKER, I-PH, 3 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR BACKUP AC
POWER (SYSTEM 2) TO THE RMS _AD PANEL A8AI POWER CONTROL
CIRCUIT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH.
CIRCUIT BREAKER IS NORMALLY CLOSED THUS THE FAILURE COULD












REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK J
l


























FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO ARM DEPLOYMENT.













PORT PRIMARY POWER (MN A)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 1
RELAY, 50 AMP FUSED, K1
RELAY, K1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A2 SKI
PART NUMBER: MC455-0134-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF PRIMARY (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO THE PORT REMOTE
MANIPULATOR ARM. BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF MISSION BY LOSS OF PRIME MODE OF RMS OPERATION.
L
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w



























PORT PRIMARY POWER (MN A)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 1
RELAY, 50 AMP FUSED, K1
RELAY, K1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF PRIMARY (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO THE PORT REMOTE
MANIPULATOR ARM. BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT. BACKUP
POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF MISSION BY LOSS OF PRIME MODE OF RMS OPERATION.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BACKUP POWER COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE
IF RMS COULD NOT BE SAFELY JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS








































FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.













PORT PRIMARY POWER (MN A)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 1
RELAY, 50 AMP FUSED, K1
RELAY, K1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APPLIES UNTIMELY PRIMARY (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO THE PORT REMOTE
MANIPULATORARM. POWER CANNOT BE REMOVED FROM ARM.
INABILITY TO DEPOWER THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM BY RELAY ACTION
WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ALONE. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES MAY WARRANT
CONSIDERATION OF DEPOWERING MN A BUS IN MPCI
t ,
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROC_LL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4037 ABORT:
ITEM: RE_Y, K2

















STBD PRIMLY PO_R (MN A)
MID PO_R CONTROL_R ASSY (MPC) i _ _ ....
_Y, 50 AMP _SED, K2
RE_Y, K2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_ING/SAFING: /NA
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
_CATION: 40V76A25K2
P_T _MBER: MC455-0134-0002
CAUSES: MEC_I_L/STRUC_L MAL_CTION, SHOCK, VIB_TION,
CO_OSION, CONTAMINATION x
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO THE STBD MANIPULATOR
_. BAC_ IS ST_DBY RED_D_T.
LOSS OF MISSION BY LOSS OF PRIME MODE OF RMS OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROC_ELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS









































FAILS OPEN WHILE ARM IS IN USE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IA








STBD PRIMARY POWER (MN A)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 1
RELAY, 50 AMP FUSED, K2
RELAY, K2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25K2
PART NUMBER: MC455-0134-0002
B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF PRIMARY (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO THE STBD MANIPULATOR
ARM. BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF MISSION BY LOSS OF PRIME MODE OF RMS OPERATION.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BACKUP POWER COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW IF ARM CANNOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISONED.
=
w
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.













STBD PRIMARY POWER (MN A)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 1
RELAY, 50 AMP FUSED, K2
RELAY, K2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
APPLIES UNTIMELY PRIMARY (28 VDC MNA) POWER TO THE STBD
MANIPULATOR ARM. POWER CANNOT BE REMOVED FROM ARM.
INABILITY TO DEPOWER THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM BY RELAY ACTION
WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE SYSTEM WITH NO OTHER FAILURES
INVOLVED. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES MAY WARRANT CONSIDERATION OF















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-40
nu
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IA
2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PORT MN BUS A, SYSTEM 1 POWER
4) MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 1
5) RELAY, Kl






















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO THE PORT REMOTE
MANIPULATOR ARM. BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY RESUNDANT.
LOSS OF MISSION BY LOSS OF PRIME MODE OF RMS OPERATION.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BACKUP POWER COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW IF THE ARM CANNOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISIONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-41
nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















2) REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
3) PORT MN BUS A, SYSTEM 1 POWER
4) MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY(MPC) 1
5) RELAY, K2

















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25F27
PART NUMBER: ME451-0016-I050
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF PRIMARY (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO THE STBD REMOTE
MANIPULATOR ARM. BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF MISSION BY LOSS OF PRIME MODE OF RMS OPERATION.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF BACKUP POWER WHILE ARM IS IN USE COULD RESULT


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE sYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u



















REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 27
OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.













PORT HEATER A POWER (MN A)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 1
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 27
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE HEATER A (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO PORT
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
LOSS OF HEATER POWER B TO PORT MANIPULATOR ARM COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MANIPULATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY, THUS LOSS OF MISSION
COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK












ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 26
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.













STBD HEATER A POWER (MN A)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 1
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 26
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE HEATER A (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO STBD
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM. _ ÷........i _!_ .... _
LOSS OF HEATER POWER B TO STBD MANIPULATOR ARM COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MANIPULATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY, THUS LOSS OF MISSION
COU_ RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

























ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 4
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
















MCIU PRIMARY POWER (MN A)
FWD POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 1
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, i0 AMP
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE PRIMARY (28 VDC MN A) POWER TO
MANIPULATOR CONTROLLER INTERFACE UNIT (MCIU). THERE ARE NO
PROVISIONS TO PROVIDE BACKUP POWER TO THE MCIU.
SINCE THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS TO PROVIDE BACKUP POWER TO THE
MCIU, IF RPC 4 FAILS OPEN, THE RESULT IS LOSS OF PRIMARY MODE OF
OPERATION OF THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSEssMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i1/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4045 ABORT:
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 31
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
















PORT BACKUP POWER (MN B)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 2
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 10 AMP
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 31
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_ _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DE ORB IT: /NA ATO: / NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPC31
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-II00
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BACKUP (28 VDC MN B) POWER TO PORT REMOTE MANIPULATOR
ARM P_O_-TO_TA_T_O_I_E__FOU_b_E_A_U_E OF ARM THUS
LOSS OF MISSION. BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF BACKUP POWER PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OR WHILE ARM IS IN USE
WOULD ABORT OPERATION OF ARM THUS LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ......
BACKUP AFTER LOSS OF PRIMARY WHILE ARM IS IN USE COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE IF ARM CANNOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS










































REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 30
OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
















STBD BACKUP POWER (MN B)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 2
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, i0 AMP
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26RPC30
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-II00
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BACKUP (28 VDC MN B) POWER TO STBD REMOTE MANIPULATOR
ARM PRIOR TO START OF ARM DEPLOYMENT WOULD NEGATE USE OF ARM THUS
LOSS OF MISSION. BACKUP POWER IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.
LOSS OF BACKUP POWER PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OR WHILE ARM IS IN USE
WOULD ABORT OPERATION OF ARM THUS LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF
BACKUP AFTER LOSS OF PRIMARY WHILE ARM IS IN USE COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE IF ARM CANNOT BE STOWED OR SAFELY JETTISONED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
m












ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 28
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.













PORT HEATER B POWER (MN B)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 2
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, I_ KM_
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 28
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE HEATER B (28 VDC MN B) POWERTO PORT
LOSS OF BOTH HEATER POWER B AND HEATER POWER A COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MANIPULATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY_
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:




ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 29
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.













STBD HEATER B POWER (MN B)
MID POWER CONTROLLER ASSY (MPC) 2
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, i0 AMP
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, RPC 29
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO : /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE HEATER B (28 VDC MN B) POWER TO STBD
REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
LOSS OF BOTH HEATER POWER B AND HEATER POWER A COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MANI_LATOR POSITIONING CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
=
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LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL R13A2
4) PL BAY MECH (PBM), SYS I, 3-PH AC POWER, ON/OFF
S) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED .........






















LOCATION: 32 V73HI 3A2 S 1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION =: =
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
INABILITY TO PRDVIqYE PAYLOAD BAY MEC}{ANICAL (PBM) SYSTEM I, 3-
PHASE AC POWER. ALTHOUGH PBM POWER IS USED BY OTHER PAYLOAD BAY
SYSTEMS, ONLY THE RMS EFFECTS ARE CONSIDERED HERE.
INABILITY TO PROVIDE SYSTEM I, 3-PHASE AC POWER TO REMOTE
MANIPULATOR RETENTION SYSTEM. FAILURE OF SYSTEM 2 COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION AND POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS












































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL RI3A2
4) PL BAY MECH (PBM), SYS I, 3-PH AC POWER, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73RI3A2SI
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL (PBM)
SYSTEM i, 3-PHASE AC POWER.
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF SYSTEM I, 3-PHASE AC PBM POWER
SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS A SINGLE FAILURE. WITH SWITCH FAILED
CLOSED. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY CIRCUIT BREAKER OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL RI3A2
4) PL BAY MECH (PBM), SYS 2, 3-PH AC POWER, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION: 32V73RI3A2S2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL (PBM) SYSTEM 2, 3-
PHASE AC POWER. ALTHOUGH PBM POWER IS USED BY PAYLOAD BAY
SYSTEMS ONLY THE RMS IS CONSIDERED HERE.
INABILITY TO PROVIDE SYSTEM 2, 3-PHASE AC PBM POWER TO REMOTE
MANIPULATOR RETENTION SYSTEM. FAILURE OF SYSTEM 1 COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4104 ABORT:
ITEM: SWITCH, $2




LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL RI3A2
4) PL BAY MECH (PBM), SYS 2, 3-PH AC POWER, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED



















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF PAYLOAD BAY MECHANICAL (PBM)
SYSTEM 2, 3-PHASE AC POWER.
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF SYSTEM 2, 3-PHASE AC PBM POWER
SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. WITH THE SWITCH FAILED CLOSED. POWER
COULD BE REMOVED BY CIRCUIT BREAKER OPERATIOn.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-53
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO C_SE TO EITHER DEP_Y OR STOW.
T._AD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
i) mS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPU_TOR DEP_Y CONTROL
3) PANEL A8A2
4) PORT MS DEP_Y/STOW
5) SWITCH, TOGGT._, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_UNCH: /NA RT_: /NA
LI_OFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUC_L MAL_NCTION, SHOCK, VIB_TION,
CO_OSION, CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE CONTROL VOLTAGE TO OPE_TE THE STOW/DEP_Y
AC_ATOR.
_SS OF OPE_TION OF THE STOW/DEPLOY AC_ATOR WOULD CAUSE _SS
OF MISSION AND POSSIBLY REQUIRE JETTISON OF REMOTE MANIPU_TOR
ARM IF IT CANNOT BE SAFELY STOWED.
_FE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_ET._CTRIC_ SCHEMATIC, RMS








































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL ASA2
4) PORT RMS DEPLOY/STOW
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: 32V73A8A2 $5
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF POWER TO THE STOW/DEPLOY ACTUATOR
MOTORS.
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF THE STOW/DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTORS COULD
CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-55
==i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO C_SE TO EITHER DEP_Y OR STOW.
T._AD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS _AD: SCHMECKPEPER
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
i) _S, 05-6IB
2) MANIPU_TOR DEP_Y CONTROL
3) PANEL A8A2
4) STBD _S DEP_Y/STOW
5) S_TCH, TOGG_, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUC_L MAL_CTION, SHOCK, VIB_TION,
CO_OSION, CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE CONTROL VOLTAGE TO OPE_TE THE STOW/DEP_Y
A_ATOR.
_SS OF OPE_TION OF THE STOW/DEPLOY AC_ATOR COULD CAUSE _SS
OF MISSION AND POSSIBLY _QUI_ JETTISON OF THE REMOTE














REFE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_LL E_CTRICAL SC_MATIC, _S
JSC-II174, SPACE S_TT_ SYSTEMS _DBOOK I























FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL A8A2
4) STBD RMS DEPLOY/STOW
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF POWER TO THE STOW/DEPLOY ACTUATOR
MOTORS.
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF THE STOW/DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTORS COULD
CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROC_Li _ELE_C_ICAi SCHEMATIC' RMS




































PORT RMS DEPLOY/STOW SWITCH, $5




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 3/ 2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE CONTROL VOLTAGE TO STOW/DEPLOY SYSTEM i
SWITCH POSITION. .....
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM 2
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO STOW/DEPLOY THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR
ARM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS











































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL A8A2
4) PORT RMS DEPLOY/STOW SWITCH, $5
5) FUSE, CONTROL VOLT BCl





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE CONTROL VOLTAGE TO STOW/DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
SWITCH POSITION.
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM 1
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO STOW/DEPLOY THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR
ARM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-I1174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m




























STBD RMS DEPLOY/STOW SWITCH, $6_




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ......... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATIONs
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INA_IL_ TO PROVIDE CONTROL VOLTAGE TO STOW/_YSYSTEM__I_..._____....
SWITCHPOSITION_ .....-_--_-_ ..............._
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM 2



















REFERENCES: VS72"956099, ROCKWELL E_CTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE _LE sYSTEMS HANDBOOK mm






















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL A8A2
4) STBD RMS DEPLOY/STOW SWITCH, $6
5) FUSE, CONTROL VOLT BCI





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE CONTROL VOLTAGE TO STOW/DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
SWITCH POSITION.
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM 1
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO STOW/DEPLOY THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR
ARM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS











ITEM: HYBRID _Y, K72
FAILLE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO C_SE.
T._.AD _ALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS _D: SCHMECKPEPER
BRE_DO_ HIE_Y:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) M_IPU_TOR DEP_Y CONTROL
3) PORT M_I_TOR DEP_Y SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
5) DEP_Y ACTUATOR MOTOR PO_R, AC3PBM
6) HYBRID _Y, AC_ATOR DEP_Y
7) HYBRID _Y, 3-P_SE
8) HYBRID _Y, K72
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA
_D_D_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ P ] c[P]
_CATION: 40V76A120K72
P_T _MBER: MC452-0123-0003
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUC_L MAL_CTION, SHOCK, VIB_TION,
CO_OSION, CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE 3-P_SE, AC3 PBM VOLTAGE TO AC_ATOR
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO DEP_Y _N. ...................
A SUBSEQUENT FAILLE IN M_IP_TOR DEP_Y CONTROL SYSTEM 2
WOULD CAUSE _SS OF ABILITY TO DEP_Y THE REMOTE _IPU_TOR _.
_FE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_LL ET._.C_ICAL SCHEMATIC, _S












































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC3PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR DEPLOY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K72
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI 20K72
PART NUMBER: MC452-0123-0003
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE, AC3 PBM VOLTAGE TO
ACTUATOR SYSTEM 1 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO DEPLOY POSITION.
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
w
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K49
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIpULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AIiS)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR _/OTOR POWER, _A_2PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR DEPLOY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K49
9)
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION ........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE 3-PHASE, AC2 PBM VOLTAGE TO ACTUATOR
SYSTEM i MOTOR TG_DRIVE TO'DEPLOY POSITION_ _ _ ......_'_.......
A SUBSEQUE_ FAILURE IN MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM 2
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO DEPLOY THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM.
i _ _ _ _i_= _ . _- _ i_ _ _ ._ ..............
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS








































ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K49
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76A118)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC2PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR DEPLOY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K49
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE, AC2 PBM VOLTAGE TO
ACTUATOR SYSTEM 1 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO DEPLOY POSITION.
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS













ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K60
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 0S-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76Ai20)
5) DEPLOY ACTUA_Mo-TOR- POW_R, AC3PBM_
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR STOW
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K60
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_ _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V? 6A120K60
PART NUMBER: MC452-0123-0003
CAUSES: MEC_I_CAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,._
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE 3-PHASE, AC3 PBM VOLTAGE TO ACTUATOR _
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM 2
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO STOW THE REMOTE MANIPULATORARM



















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-iiI74, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS_BOOK _ _ mm
i



















FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.






2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC3PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR STOW
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K60
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20K60
PART NUMBER: MC452-0123-0003
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE, AC3 PBM VOLTAGE TO
ACTUATOR SYSTEM 1 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO STOW POSITION.
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A STOW ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, KS1
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




















STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MM_C)-2_4OV76Aii8) _ _i i _ i
DEPLOY ACTUATOR _MOT_:_, A_2PBM




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY........ TO PROVIDE 3-PHASE, AC3 PBM VOLTAGE TQ_ACTUATOR
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO THE STOW POSITION.
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM 2
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO STOW THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM






















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





























FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC2PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR STOW
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K51
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] CC ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8KSI
PART NUMBER: MC452-0123-0003
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE, AC3 PBM VOLTAGE TO
ACTUATOR SYSTEM 1 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO THE STOW POSITION.
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A STOW ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
m
w
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w



















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMEC_EPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR PO_R, AC2PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR DEPLOY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-P_SE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K22
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P_UNCH: /NA RT_: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUC_L MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_: ........
INABILITY TO PROVIDE 3-P_SE, AC2 PBM VOLTAGE TO ACTUATOR
SYSTEM2 MOTOR TO DRIVE TOTHE DEPLOY POSIT_ON. _ii_ _
A SUBSEQU_T_L_IN_MANIPULATORDEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM 1
WOULD CAUSE INABILITY TO DEPLOY THEREMOTE MANIPU_TORARM THUS
CAUSiNG_SS OF_MISSION .........
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS










































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC2PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR DEPLOY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K22
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE, AC2 PBM VOLTAGE TO
ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO THE DEPLOY POSITION.
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC3PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR DEPLOY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K62
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8K62
PART NUMBER: MC452-0123-0003
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE 3-PHASE, AC2 PBM VOLTAGE TO ACTUATOR
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR TO DRIVE TOTHE DEPLOY POSITION. _ .........
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM 1
WOULD CAUSE INABILITY TO DEPLOY THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM THUS
















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK I























FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC3PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR DEPLOY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K62
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 1/1 AOA: / NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE, AC2 PBM VOLTAGE TO
ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO THE DEPLOY POSITION.
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-73REPORT DATE 02/25/87
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4125 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID R LAY, K24




LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MM_-_- (40V76AIIS)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC2PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR STOW
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K24
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F_C _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE 3-PHASE, AC3 PBM VOLTAGE TO-A_CTUATOR
SYSTE-M-2 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO THE_I_N. _ _:_.....:_i:i_ ...._
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM 1
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO STOW THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
THUS REQUIRING JETTISON OF THE ARM. _
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS'_HA/_DBOOK











































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC2PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR STOW
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K24
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8K24
PART NUMBER: MC452-0123-0003
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE, AC3 PBM VOLTAGE TO
ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO THE STOW POSITION.
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A STOW ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
L_
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-75
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4127 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, KS0




LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC3PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR STOW
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K50
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE 3-PHASE, AC3 PBM VOLTAGE TO ACTUATOR
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO THE STOW POSITION.
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL SYSTEM i
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO STOW THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
AND POSSIBLY REQUIRE JETTISON OF THE ARM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS































ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, KS0
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76A120)
5) DEPLOY ACTUATOR MOTOR POWER, AC3PBM
6) HYBRID RELAY, ACTUATOR STOW
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-PHASE
8) HYBRID RELAY, KS0
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8KS0
PART NUMBER: MC452-0123-0003
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNINTENTIONAL APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE, AC3 PBM VOLTAGE TO
ACTUATOR SYSTEM 1 MOTOR TO DRIVE TO THE STOW POSITION.
UNTIMELY OPERATION OF A STOW ACTUATOR MOTOR COULD CAUSE
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE RMS/PAYLOADS/ORBITER. LOSS OF MISSION AND
POSSIBLY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
n
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4129 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVERS, AR9, II




LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76A119)--_._I
5) PORT RMS DEPLOY TAL_I( INDY_OR DS4 _
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE I, 2 EACH





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA _ TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSIOH,_-CONT_ITINATION -_ ......_ ...
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO E_E_ _AS_ LONq_ A_Y_TEM_._2 IS FUNCTIgNAL _ ........._ ... _.....
SUBSE_TSiM_ FAILURE IN SYSTEM 2 WOULD NOT_ROVIDE POWER
TO DRIVE THE TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4 ON SWITCH $5 ON PANEL ASA2 TO
INDICATE 'DEPLOYED'.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
















































HYBRID DRIVERS, AR9, ii
FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AI19)
5) PORT RMS DEPLOY TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE I, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD GIVE ERRONEOUS SIGNAL TO TALKBACK INDICATOR.
IDEPLOYED' TALKBACK INDICATION NOT CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-79REPORT DATE 02/25/87
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI3, 15
FAILS OPEN, ONE OR BOTH.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 0S-6ZB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
5) PORT RMS DEPLOY TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE i, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATIONn
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFEcTS/RATIONALE: _
NO EFFECT AS LONG AS SYSTEM 1 IS FUNCTIONAL.
SUBSEQUENT SIMILAR FAILURE IN SYSTEM 2 WOULD NOT PROVIDE POWER
TO DRIVE THE TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4 ON SWITCH $5 ON PANEL A8A2 TO
INDICATE DEPLOYED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




































ITEM: HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI3, 15
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
5) PORT RMS DEPLOY TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE 1, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8ARI3, 15
PART NUMBER: ME477-0261-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD GIVE ERRONEOUS SIGNAL TO TALKBACK INDICATOR.
'DEPLOYED' TALKBACK INDICATION NOT CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-81REPORT DATE 02/25/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















HYBRID DRIVERS, _8, I0
FAI_ OPEN, ONE OR BOTH.
T._AD _ALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
1) _S, 05-6iB
2) M_IPU_TOR DEP_Y CONTROL
3) PORT M_IPU_TOR DEP_Y SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII9)
5) PORT RMS STOW TALKBACK _DI_ATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE i, 2 EACH




FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P__CH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUC_L MAL_CTION, SHOCK, VIB_TION,
CO_OSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
NO EFFECT _ _NG AS SYSTEM 2 IS _CTIONAL, ...........
SUBSEQUENT SIMI_ FAIL_ IN SYSTEM 2 WOULD NOT PROVIDE POWER
TO DRIVE THE TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4 ON SWITCH $5 ON PANEL A8A2 TO
INDICATE STOOD.
_FE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_LL E_CTRICAL SC_MATIC, _S

































ITEM: HYBRID DRIVERS, AR8, i0
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AI19)
5) PORT RMS STOW TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE i, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII9AR8, 10
PART NUMBER: ME477-0261-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD GIVE ERRONEOUS SI_GNAL TO TALKBACK INDICATOR.
THE CRT DISPLAY STOWED INDICATION WOULD DISAGREE WITH THE
TALKBACK INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 14
FAILS OPEN, ONE OR BOTH.













PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
PORT RMS STOW TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE i, 2 EACH
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO : /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS LONG AS SYSTEM 1 IS FUNCTIONAL.
SUBSEQUENT SIMILAR FAILURE IN SYSTEM 2 WOULD NOT PROVIDE POWER
TO DRIVE THE TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4 ON SWITCH $5 ON PANEL ASA2 TO
INDICATE STOWED STATE.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






























ITEM: HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 14
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
S) PORT RMS STOW TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE i, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD GIVE ERRONEOUS SIGNAL TO TALKBACK INDICATOR.
THE CRT DISPLAY STOWED INDICATION WOULD DISAGREE WITH THE
TALKBACK INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-85
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI4, 18
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, ONE OR BOTH.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AIIT)
5) STBD RMS DEPLOY TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE i, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/?U_C .... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, C_NATION .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS LONG AS SYSTEM 2 IS FUNCTIONAL, .........
SUBSE_E-NT SIMI_ FAIL_IN SYSTE-M=2 WO_ULD NOT_PROVIDE POWER
TO DRIVE THE TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4 ON SWITCH $5 ON PANEL A8A2 TO
INDICATE DEPLOYED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS











































ITEM: HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI4, 18
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
S) STBD RMS DEPLOY TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE 1, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: / NA
DEORBIT" /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AIITARI4, 18
PART NUMBER: ME477-0261-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD GIVE ERRONEOUS SIGNAL_TOTALKBACK INDICATOR.
'DEPLOYED' TALKBACK INDICATION NOT CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












HYBRID DRIVERS, AR6, 8
FAILS OPEN, ONE OR BOTH.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MHANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2 ......._ ...... _ ___
4) M_ MOTO_ONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20) _
5) STBD RMS DEPLOY TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE I, 2 EACH






















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS LONG AS SYSTEM 1 IS FUNCTIONAL. _ i _ _
TO DRIVE THE TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4 ON SWITCH $5 ON PANEL ASA2 TO
INDICATE DEPLOYED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

































ITEM: HYBRID DRIVERS, AR6, 8
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76A120)
5) STBD RMS DEPLOY TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE 1, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD GIVE ERRONEOUS SIGNAL TO TALKBACK INDICATOR.
'DEPLOYED' TALKBACK INDICATION NOT CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, P.MS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
z
m














HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 16
FAILS OPEN, ONE OR BOTH.












STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC_-I _40V76AIiT)
STBD RMS STOW TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE i, 2 EACH
HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ...... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS LONG AS SYSTEM 2 IS FUNCTIONAL. ................
SUBSEQUENT SIMILAR FAILURE IN SYSTEM 2 _T PROVIDE POWER
TO DRIVE THE TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4 ON SWITCH $5 ON PANEL A8A2 TO
INDICATE STOWED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4142 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVERS, ARI2, 16




LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 1
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
5) STBD RMS STOW TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE i, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII7ARI2, 16
PART NUMBER: ME477-0261-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD GIVE ERRONEOUS SIGNAL TO TALKBACK INDICATOR.
THE CRT DISPLAY STOWED INDICATION WOULD DISAGREE WITH THE
TALKBACK INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS















HYBRID DRIVERS, AR2, 4
FAILS OPEN, ONE OR BOTH.













STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
STBD RMS STOW TKLIXBA_K INDICAT<)R DS4
HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE I, 2 EACH
HYBRID DRIVERS, AR2, 4
_9_R!TIgALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS :
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA











CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONT_INATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT AS LONG AS SYSTEM 1 IS FUNCTIONAL.
SUBSEQUENT STMI'LAR FAILURE IN sYSTEM2WOULD NOT PROVIDE POWER
TO DRIVE THE TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4 ON SWITCH $5 ON PANEL A8A2 TO
INDICATE STOWED.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






































HYBRID DRIVERS, AR2, 4
FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR DEPLOY SYSTEM 2
4) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
5) STBD RMS STOW TALKBACK INDICATOR DS4
6) HYBRID DRIVERS, TYPE i, 2 EACH




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD GIIVE ERRONEOUS SIGNAL TO TALKBACK INDICATOR.
THE CRT DISPLAY STOWED INDICATION WOULD DISAGREE WITH THE
TALKBACK INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-93REPORT DATE 02/25/87
BINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB2
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) PBM POWER, SYSTEM i, MCA LOGIC
5) MCA POWER, AC i, 3-PHASE, MID 1
6) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3-PH, 3 AMP




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB2
PART NUMBER: ME454-0032-3030
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE ACI 3-PHASE POWER TO ACl PBM BUS IN MMCl.
LOSS OF AC 3-PHASE POWER TO DRIVE SYSTEM 1 MID RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR
MECHANISM. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS







































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) PBM POWER, SYSTEM i, MCA LOGIC
5) MCA POWER, AC 1, 3-PHASE, MID 1
6) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3-PH, 3 AMP




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH OR RELAY ACTION.
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-95REPORT DATE 02/25/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.














PBM POWER, SYSTEM i, MCA LOGIC
MCA POWER, AC 2, 3-PHASE, MID 2
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3-PH, 3 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB7
CRIT!CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO : /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 85V 73A129 CB7
PART NUMBER: ME454-0032-3030
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
INABILITY TO PROVIDE AC2 3-PHASE POWER TO AC2 PBM BUS IN MMC2'
LOSS OF A_3_--EE--__ _rV__ __TE__L_CH
ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR
MECHANISM. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK






































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) PBM POWER, SYSTEM 1, MCA LOGIC
5) MCA POWER, AC 2, 3-PHASE, MID 2
6) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3-PH, 3 AMP
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129 CB7
PART NUMBER: ME454-0032-3030
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH OR RELAY ACTION.
NO EFFECT.
i
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-97REPORT DATE 02/25/87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 11/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4149 ABORT:
ITEM: CIR_IT B_R, CBI2




T,_AD _ALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS _AD: SCHMECKPEPER
B_O_ HIE_C_:
i) MS, 05-6IB
2) M_IPU_TOR DEP_Y CONTROL
3) P_EL MA73C
4) PBM PO_ SYSTEM i, M_ _GiC
5) MCA PO_R, AC 3, 3-P_E, MTD 2
6) CIR_IT B_R, 3-PH, 3 _P




FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C _ ......A_RT HDW/_C
P__: /NA RT_ : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /_
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ]
_TION: 85V73A129CB12
P_T _MBER: ME454-0032-3030
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUC_L MAL_CTION, SHOCK, VIB_TION,
CO_OSION, CO_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
INABILITYTO PROVIDE AC3 3-PHASE POWER TO AC3 __S IN MMC2.
LOSS OF AC _-__WER TO DR_SYSTEM 1 A_T_E_N LATCH
AC_ATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAILU_ IN _DUND_T SYSTEM 2 WOULD
CAUSE _SS OF ABILITY TO OPE_TE THE AFT _TENTION _TCH AC_ATOR




















_FE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_LL E_CTRI_L SCHEMATIC, MS
JSC-II174, SPACE S_TT_ SYSTEMS _DBOOK I
1








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:




ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) PBM POWER, SYSTEM i, MCA LOGIC
5) MCA POWER, AC 3, 3-PHASE, MID 2
6) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3-PH, 3 AMP




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB12
PART NUMBER: ME454-0032-3030
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH OR RELAY ACTION.
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
=















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS T_AD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANI_LATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MAT 3C
4) PBM POWER_ _ SYSTEM 2, MCA LOGIC
5) MCA POWER, AC i, 3-PHASE, MID 3
6) CIR_IT BREA_R, 3-PH, 3 AMP




FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C .... ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /_A
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
_DUNDANCY SC_ENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB3
PART NUMBER: ME454-0032-3030
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION ..... _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE ACI 3-PHASE POWER TO ACI PBM BUS IN MMC3.
LOSS OF AC 3-PHASE POWER TO DRI_ST_ 2 AFT RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAIL_ IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD
CAUSE _SS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE AFT RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR
ME_ISM, _SS OF MISSION COULD _SULT ......
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL E_CTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






















_PORT DATE 02/25/87 C-100
m
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73 C
4) PBM POWER, SYSTEM 2, MCA LOGIC
5) MCA POWER, AC i, 3-PHASE, MID 3
6) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3-PH, 3 AMP




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129CB3
PART NUMBER: ME454-0032-3030
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH OR RELAY ACTION.
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-101REPORT DATE 02/25/87
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB9
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) PBM PO_, SYSTEM 2, MCA LOGIC
5) MCA POWER, AC 2, 3-PHASE_, MID
6) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3-PH, 3 AMP
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29CB9
PART NUMBER: ME454-0032-3030 ...... _:_
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE AC2 3-PHASE POWER TO AC2 PBM BUS IN MMC4.
LOSS OF AC 3-PHASEPOWERTODRIVE SYSTEM 2 MI[Y7RETE}_vIONLATCH
ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR
MECHANISM. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






































ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB9
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73 C
4) PBM POWER, SYSTEM 2, MCA LOGIC
5) MCA POWER, AC 2, 3-PHASE, MID 4
6) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3-PH, 3 AMP




















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH OR RELAY ACTION.
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-I03REPORT DATE 02/25/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CBI3











2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) PBM POWER, SYSTEM 2, MCA LOGIC
5) MCA PO_ _, AC 3, 3-PHASE,_-M-Ib 4 _
6) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3-PH, 3 AMP




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_gu_d ....... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE AC3 3-PHASE POWER TO AC3 PBM BUS IN MMC4.
LOSS_6_r_C_-_-_A_S_POWER_DRIVE-SYSTEM_2=F_RETENTIONLATu_H
ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK mI
n























LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MAT 3C
4) PBM POWER, SYSTEM 2, MCA LOGIC
5) MCA POWER, AC 3, 3-PHASE, MID 4
6) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3-PH, 3 AMP




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH OR RELAY ACTION.
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN A POWER, MID i, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DE ORB IT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN A 28VDC POWER TO MMCl.
LOSS OF MN A 28 VDC POWER TO MMCI DISABLES OPERATION OF SYSTEM
1 MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF SYSTEM
2 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR MECHANISM. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS








































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN A POWER, MID 1, ON/OFF
S) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73A129S2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401





REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN A POWER, MID 3, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION ..... ..............
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN A 28VDC POWER TO MMC3.
LOSS OF MN A 28 VDC POWER T_ MMC3DISABLES OPERATIO_ OF SYSTEM
2 AFT RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF SYSTEM
2 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION LATCH
















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYS_MS HANDBOOK
mm

















FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN A POWER, MID 3, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA










REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK














LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN B POWER, MID 2, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29S7
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN B 28VDC POWER TO MMC2.
LOSS OF MN B 28 VDC POWER TO MMC2 DISABLES OPERATION OF SYSTEM
1 FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF SYSTEM
2 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR MECHANISM. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS












































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN B POWER, MID 2, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA










REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-lll
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN B POWER, MID 4, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN B 28VDC POWER TO MMC4.
LOSS OF MN B 28 VDC POWER TO MMC4 DISABLES OPERATION OF SYSTEM
2 MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF SYSTEM
2 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION LATCH
















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
_m


























LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN B POWER, MID 4, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED






























REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-I13REPORT DATE 02/25/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN C POWER, MID 2, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, M_NTA_NED .........





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29SI2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN C 28VDC POWER TO MMC2_
LOSS OF MN C 28 VDC POWER TO MMC2 DISABLEs OPERATION oF-sYSTEM
1 AFT RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF SYSTEM
2 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION LATCH


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
























LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN C POWER, MID 2, ON/OFF
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA










REFERENCES: VS72"gs6099, ROC_LL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-I15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.



















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN C 28VDC POWER TO MMC4.
LOSS OF MN C 28 VDC POWER TO MMC4 DISABLES OPERATION OF SYSTEM
2 FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF SYSTEM
2 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION LATCH















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


























LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73 C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN C POWER, MID 4, ON/OFF
S) SWITCH, TOGGLE, MAINTAINED

















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29S13
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401
B[ ] C[ ]





REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-i17REPORT DATE 02/25/87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN A POWER, MID I, ON/OFF, $2
5) RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROS ION, CONTAMINATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH $2 WILL NOT FUNCTION TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN A 28VDC
POWER TO MMCI_ _ _ _ ....
LOSS OF MN A 28 VDC POWER TO MMCI DISABLES OPERATION OF SYSTEM
1 _D RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN
SYSTEM 2 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION
LATCH MECHANISM. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN A POWER, MID 3, ON/OFF, $3
5) RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 85V73AI29R3
PART NUMBER: RLR4201201GM
] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH $3 WILL NOT FUNCTION TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN A 28VDC
POWER TO MMCI.
LOSS OF MN A 28 VDC POWER TO MMC3 DISABLES OPERATION OF SYSTEM
2 MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN
SYSTEM 1 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION
LATCH MECHANISM. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT.
L
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN B POWER, MID 2, ON/OFF, S7
5) RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING ......





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA :_ !





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH $7 WILL NOT FUNCTION TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN A 28VDC
POWER TO MMCI.
LOSS OF MN A 28 VDC POWER TO MMC2 DISABLES OPERATION OF SYSTEM
1 MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT F_ILDTd_ IN
SYSTEM 2 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION

















REFE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_ELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
I
m



































MCA LOGIC, MN B POWER, MID 4, ON/OFF, $9
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM 2 WATT
RESISTOR, R9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 85V73AI29R9
PART NUMBER: RLR4201201GM
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH $9 WILL NOT FUNCTION TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN A 28VDC
POWER TO MMCI.
LOSS OF MN A 28 VDC POWER TO MMC4 DISABLES OPERATION OF SYSTEM
2 MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN
SYSTEM 1 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION
LATCH MECHANISM. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK














LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN C POWER, _ 2, ON/OFF, $12
5) RESISTOR, _NT LIMITING _





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ................ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA ......





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH S12 WILL NOT FUNCTION TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN A 28VDC
POWER TO MMCI.
LOSS OF MN A 28 VDC POWER TO MMC2 DISABLES OPERATION OF SYSTEM
1 MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN
SYSTEM 2 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION
















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
I







ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET










FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IB
2) MANIPULATOR DEPLOY CONTROL
3) PANEL MA73C
4) MCA LOGIC, MN C POWER, MID 4, ON/OFF, S13
5) RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 85V73AI29RI3
PART NUMBER: RLR4201201GM
] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH $13 WILL NOT FUNCTION TO DRIVE RPC TO PROVIDE MN A 28VDC
POWER TO MMCl.
LOSS OF MN A 28 VDC POWER TO MMC4 DISABLES OPERATION OF SYSTEM
2 MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR MOTOR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN
SYSTEM 1 WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE MID RETENTION
LATCH MECHANISM. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
C-123REPORT DATE 02/25/87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K20
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IC i .....
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AS) _ : :
5) MID MOTOR CONT_0LLER (MMC)--2-_0V7_118)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS i, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, }(20
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-2 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE PORT MANIPU_TOR FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR
TO THE LATCH POSITION.
...._:_SUBSEQ_NT FAILURE OF RE_DUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULDRESULTIN














REFERENCES: VS72"956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK I
U






















FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AS)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 1, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K20
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF PLBM AC-2 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR COULD DRIVE THE PORT MANIPULATOR FWD RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR LATCHING COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO
RMS/ORBITER/PAYLOADS. IF FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER APPLIED TO
THE RELEASE DRIVE MOTOR, MOTOR FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT SYSTEM RESULTS IN INABILITY TO LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAI_ TO C_SE.
_AD _ALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) mS, 05-6IC
2) M_IPU_TOR _TCH CONTROL
3) STBD M_IPU_TOR _TCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) _D _TCH AC_ATOR (40V54AIS)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROL_R (MMC)-4 (40V76A_) _
6) _D AC_ATOR SYS i, _T_ _Y
7) HYBRID _Y, 3-PO_
8) HYBRID _Y, K52
9)
CRITIcAL_TIES

















CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUC_L MAL_CTION, SHOCK, VIB_TION,
CO_OSION, CO_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE STBD M_IPU_TOR _D _TENTION _TCH AC_ATOR
TO THE _TCH POSITION.
_Y SUBSEQUENT FAILU_ OF _D_D_T SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO _TCH T_ ST_BO_D _D _TCH MEC_ISM.
_FE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_LL ET_CTRICAL SCHEMATIC, mS





































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON "SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A15)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS I, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K52
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20K52
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR COULD DRIVE THE STBD MANIPULATOR FWD RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR LATCHING COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE
RMS/ORBITER/PAYLOADS. IF FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING
APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT SYSTEM RESULTS IN INABILITY TO LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK




ITEM: HYBRID _Y, K8
FAIL_ MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO C_SE.
_AD _ALYST: ROBINSON
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



















PORT M_IPU_TOR _TCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
_D _TCH AC_AT__V54AS)_ _ ! _ _ i_ /_ _ i
MID MOT_ CO_OL_R (MM_--2 _40V-76AIi8)




FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT














CAUSES: ME_ICAL/STRUC_L MAL_CTION, SHOCK, VIB_TIONr
CO_OSION, CO_INATION ....
EFFECTS/_TIONA7._.:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-2 115 VAC_O Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DR_ETHE PORT M_IPU_TOR__TE_ION _TCH ACTUATOR
TO THE _L_ASE POSITION.
_Y SUBSEQUENT FAIL_ OF _D_D_T SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN















_FE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_LL E_CTRI_L SCHEMATIC, _S
JSC-II174, SPACE S_TT7._. SYSTEMS _DBOOK 1




















ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K8
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6iC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AlI8)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 1, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K8
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF PLBM AC-2 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR COULD DRIVE THE PORT MANIPULATOR FWD RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR RELEASE COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE
RMS/ORBITER/PAYLOADS. IF THE FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS
BEING APPLIED TO LATCH, MOTOR FAILURE COULD OCCUR. SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO RELEASE.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4207 ABORT:
HYBRID RELAY, K64
OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:






2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STRD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL , SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AIS) _i _/_--_:_i_-_ ii
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 =_(40V76Ai20) _
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS i, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K64
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: /NA
DEORBI T: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA ........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20K64
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR-TO ° DRTVEc_!_--STUD M_TPULATOR -_D_ _TEI_0N LATCH ACTUATOR
TO THE RELEASE POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO RELEASE-THE STARBOARD _ LATCH MECHANISM. _
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS









































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STRD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A15)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS i, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K64
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLLICATION OF PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR COULD DRIVE THE STBD MANIPULATOR FWD RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR RELEASE COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE
RMS/ORBITER/PAYLOADS. IF THE FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS
BEING APPLIED TO LATCH, MOTOR FAILURE COULD OCCUR. SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO RELEASE.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-131
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESS_NT
















FAILS CLOSED IN RESET OR DEADFACE POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHM_CKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5) ......
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AIiS)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS i, GND-RESET/DFACE RELAY




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8K44
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















I?-?A_ IN THE D_ADF-ACE POSITION, NEITHER THE LATCH OR ::
RELEASE FUNCTION OF PORT SYSTEM 1 FWD ACTUATOR COULD BE OPERATED.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO DEADFACE IF FAILED IN RESET POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ET._.CTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





REPORT DATE 03/02/87 C-132
u...
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED IN RESET OR DEADFACE POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 1, GND-RESET/DFACE RELAY




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE STBD FWD MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUIRED.
IF FAILED IN THE DEADFACE POSITION, NEITHER THE LATCH OR
RELEASE FUNCTION OF STBD SYSTEM 1 FWD ACTUATOR COULD BE OPERATED.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO DEADFACE IF FAILED IN RESET POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 03/02/87 C-133
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















_AD _ALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) M_IPU_TOR _TCH CO_ROL
3) PORT M_IPU_TOR _TCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) _D _TCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5) _
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) _D _ADY-TO-_TCH SW ASSY 1 (V54X0840E)




FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_CH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUC_L MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIB_TION,
CO_OSION, CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PORT _D SYSTEM 1 'FWD READY TO _TCH' SIGNAL
(V54X0837E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DSI0 ON P_EL A8A2 OR (V54X0840E)
TO MDM 0A2.
_SS OF MEAS_MENT.
REFE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_ELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS










































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A15)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76A120)
6) FWD READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 1 (V54XI040E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120F6
PART NUMBER: MC451-0018-0200
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 'FWD READY TO LATCH' SIGNAL
(V54Xi037E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS9 ON PANEL A8A2 OR (V54XI040E)
TO MDM OA2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AI18)
6) FWD READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 1 (V54X0840E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 'FWD READY TO LATCH' SIGNAL
(V54X0840E) TO MDM OA2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






























FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 1 (V54XI040E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 'FWD READY TO LATCH' SIGNAL
(V54XI040E) TO MDM OA2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-137
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

























MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL .........
PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
FWD READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 1 (V54X0840E)
RESISTOR, BLEED, 1.8K OHM
RESISTOR, R28
_CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A118R28
PART _BER: RLR0701801GR ............
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 'FWD READY TO LATCH' SIGNAL
(V54xO84_E)_TO_MDMOA2 _(V54X084OE)_ _ _ _ .....

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS --






















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 1 (V54XI040E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20R63
PART NUMBER: RLR0701801GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 'FWD READY TO LATCH' SIGNAL
(V54XI040E) TO MDM OA2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-139
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76A!I8)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS i, LATCH/RELEASE (K44-A3)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL
TO APPROPRIATE ACTUATOR MOTOR RELAY K20/K8.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE PORT SYSTEM 1 FWD RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO EITHER LATCH OR RELEASE. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF
REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40VS4AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS I, LATCH/RELEASE (K76-A3)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL
TO APPROPRIATE ACTUATOR MOTOR RELAY K52/K64.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE STBD SYSTEM 1 FWD RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO EITHER LATCH OR RELEASE. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF
REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-141
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS i, K20 LATCHED, (V54XO860E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V54XO86_0E) TO MDM OA2 OR (V54X0859E) TO EVENT















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




























LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS I, K52 LATCHED, (V54XI060E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: / NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V54XI060E) TO MDM OA2 OR (V54XI059E) TO EVENT
INDICATOR ON PANEL A8A2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS l, K8 RELEASED, (VS4X0870E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ....... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEDRBIT: _ /NA _ ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING
MEASU_E_NT-(VS4X0870E) TO_MDM-OA2OR_(V54X0869E) TO EVENT
INDICATOR ON PA_ELASA2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS










































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A15)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS I, K64 RELEASED, (V54XI070E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V54XI070E) TO MDM OA2 OR (V54XI069E) TO EVENT
INDICATOR ON PANEL ASA2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) M_IP_TOR LATCH CON_OL ..... _=
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) FWD ACT SYS i, LATCH EVENT, ASA2S6DS5, (VSX40859E)
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
8) HYBRID DRIVER, AR4
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEOI_IT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54X0859E) TO--EVE-NT INDICATOR-DSS 0N _P_EL A8A2 SWITCH S6.















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-146
ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, AR4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) FWD ACT SYS 1, LATCH EVENT, ASA2S6DSS, (VSX40859E)
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
8) HYBRID DRIVER, AR4
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE ERRONEOUS PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54X0859E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS5 ON PANEL A8A2 SWITCH $6.
LOSS OF EVENT INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
u
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-147
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, ARI0
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACT SYS i, LATCH EVENT, A8A2S3DSI0, (V54XI059E)
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
8) HYBRID DRIVER, ARI0
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54XI059E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS5 ON PANEL A8A2 SWITCH $3.














REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS _


























ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, ARI0
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACT SYS i, LATCH EVENT, A8A2S3DSI0,
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE ERRONEOUS STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54XI059E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS5 ON PANEL ASA2 SWITCH $3.
LOSS OF EVENT INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, AR5















STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
FWD ACT SYS i, RELEASE EVENT, ASA2S6DS5, (VS4X0859E)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
HYBRID DRIVER, AR5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION .......
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54X0869_ TO EVENT INDICATOR DS5 ON PANEL A8A2 SWITCH $6.




















REFERENCES: VS72"956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE sYsTEMS HANDBOOK D
i























LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) FWD ACT SYS i, RELEASE EVENT, ASA2S6DS5,
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE ERRONEOUS PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54X0869E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS5 ON PANEL ASA2 SWITCH $6.
LOSS OF EVENT INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-IlI74, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
































PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A15)
MID MOTOR CONTROLLEi_ _ CMMC_-4 (40V76AI_0_ _
FWD ACT SYS i, RELEASE EVENT, A8A2S3DSI0, (V54XI059E)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
HYBRID DRIVER, AR13
__ _ITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC .......ABO-RT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /N A
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54XI069E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS5 ON PANEL A8A2 SWITCH $3.
LOSS OF EVENT INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS72'956099, ROCKWELLELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




























ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, AR13
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACT SYS i, RELEASE EVENT, A8A2S3DSI0,
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE ERRONEOUS STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54XI069E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS5 ON PANEL A8A2 SWITCH $3.
LOSS OF EVENT INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK



















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AS)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) HYBRID DRIVER, AR4, FUSE




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SA_ING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54X0859E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS5 ON PANEL ASA2 SWITCH S6.













REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS_
JSC-Iii74, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
B


















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76A120)
6) HYBRID DRIVER, ARI0, FUSE




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54XI059E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS9 ON PANEL A8A2 SWITCH $3.
LOSS OF EVENT INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-155
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.






2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) HYBRID DRIVER, AR5, FUSE
7) FUSE, 2 AMP
8) FUSE, ARSFi
9)
CRITICA  T ES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PORT FWD SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL ........
(V54X08_9_ TO EVENT INDOOR DS5 ON P_ _2-SWITCH $6.
LOSS OF EVENT INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS







































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) HYBRID DRIVER, ARI3, FUSE




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE STBD FWD SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL
(V54XI069E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS5 ON PANEL ASA2 SWITCH $3.
LOSS OF EVENT INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-157
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC -_
2) MANTPULATOR LATCH CONTROL ...........
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
S) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
6) MID AC_ATOR SYS i, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K55
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE PORT MAN_MIDRETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR
TO _LATCH P_SITIOq_. _ ..........................._ - _
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LATCH THE PORT MID LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS









































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 1, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K55
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII7K55
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR COULD DRIVE THE PORT MANIPULATOR MID RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
THE FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE,
MOTOR FAILURE COULD RESULT. ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT
SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH THE PORT MID LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-159
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76A120)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS i, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K69
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20K69
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NO T PROVIDE PLBM AC-2 115VAC 4Q0 HzPOWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE STARBO_D MANIPULATOR MID RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR ...........TO THE LATCH POSITION. _:
ANY "SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LATCH THE STBD MID LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS













































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS i, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K69
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF PLBM AC-2 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR COULD DRIVE THE STARBOARD MANIPULATOR MID
RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED
EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
THE FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE,
MOTOR FAILURE COULD RESULT. ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT
SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH THE STBD MID LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-161
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)- ! (40V76AIiT)




















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE PORT MANIPULATOR MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR
TO THE RELEASE POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO RELEASE THE PORT MID LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS








































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AIIT)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS i, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K43
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR COULD DRIVE THE PORT MANIPULATOR MID RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
THE FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO LATCH,
MOTOR FAILURE COULD RESULT. ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT
SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO RELEASE THE PORT MID LATCH.
w REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-163
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS I, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K57
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ] _




CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_W_LLN02_PRQ_IDE P_BMAC__-2 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR T9 DRIVE THE STARBO_D MID MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK ÷
u
I






















FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76A120)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS i, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K57
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF PLBMAC-2 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR COULD DRIVE THE STARBOARD MID MANIPULATOR
RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE POSITION AS AN
UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
THE FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO LATCH,
MOTOR FAILURE COULD RESULT. ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT
SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO RELEASE THE STBD MID LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-165
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RELAY, K57 _ _
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED IN RESET OR DEADFACE POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS i, GND-RESET/DFACE RELAY




















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE MID MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUIRED, _ _......._ ii_ _-_ ...._ ... _ _ ......
IF FAI_D iN_E DEADFACE POSITION NEITHER THE LATCH OR_RELEASE
FUNCTION OF THE PORT SYSTEM 1 MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR COULD
BE OPERATED. LOSS OF ABILITY TO DEADFACE IF FAILED IN THE RESET

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK U
m






















FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED IN RESET OR DEADFACE POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 1, GND-RESET/DFACE RELAY




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE MID MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUIRED.
IF FAILED IN THE DEADFACE POSITION NEITHER THE LATCH OR RELEASE
FUNCTION OF THE STBD SYSTEM 1 MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR COULD
BE OPERATED. LOSS OF ABILITY TO DEADFACE IF FAILED IN THE RESET
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
=
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-167
INDEPENDENT0RBITERASSESS_T





















PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6) _
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AIIT)
MID READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 2 (V54X0842E)











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 'MID READY-T0-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54X0842E) TO MDM OF4 OR (V54X0838E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS8 ON
PANEL A8A2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK








































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 2 (V54XI042E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120F4
PART NUMBER: MC451-0018-0200
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 'MID READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54XI042E) TO MDM OAI OR (V54X1038E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS7 ON
PANEL A8A2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-169
m
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6) : _ .......
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76Al17)
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 2 (V54X0842E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII7R29
PART NUMBER: R_2002201GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 'MID READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54X0842E) TO MDM OF4.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS









































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 2 (V54XI042E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20R65
PART NUMBER: RLR2002201GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 'MID READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54X1042E) TO MDM OA1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
L
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-171
EINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05.6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 2 (V54X0842E)
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 40V76A117R28
PART NUMBER: RLR0701801GR
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 'MID READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

























LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 2 (V54XI042E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120R61
PART NUMBER: RLR0701801GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 'MID READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54XI042E) TO MDM OAI.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK



















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM i, LATCH/RELEASE (K57-A3)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII7RI
PART NUMBER: RLR420120iGM
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL TO
APPROPRIATE ACTUATOR MOTOR RELAY K55/K43.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE PORT SYSTEM I MID RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO EITHER LATCH OR RELEASE. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN
REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM I, LATCH/RELEASE (K80-A3)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20RII
PART NUMBER: RLR4201201GM
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL TO
APPROPRIATE ACTUATOR MOTOR RELAY K69/H57.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE STBD SYSTEM 1 MID RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO EITHER LATCH OR RELEASE. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN
REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-175
nINDE_NDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM 1, K55 LATCHED, (V54X0862E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: / NA RT LS: / NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: / NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA






WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V54X0872E) TO MDM OF4.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.












REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
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FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM 1, K69 LATCHED, (V54XI062E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V54XI062E) TO MDM OA1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i



















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6) ..............
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)'I (40V76AII7) ....
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM i, K43 LATCHED, (V54XI062E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING














REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-178
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM i, K57 RELEASED, (V54XI072E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20RI5
PART NUMBER: RLR0705101GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V54XI072E) TO MDM OAI.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
w
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-179
nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS i, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K75
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8K75
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE PORT MANIPULATOR AFT RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR
TO THE LATCH POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LATCH THE PORT AFT LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS



































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM i
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 1, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K75
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE PORT MANIPULATOR AFT
RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED
EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR LATCHING COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2
COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE STBD AFT LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-181
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPU_TOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS i, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K78
9)
....CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WIlL NOT_PRQVIDE_PLBM AC-! I_S V_:_,1400 Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE STARBOARD MANIPULATOR AFT RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO THE q_ATCH POSITION, .................
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LATCH THE STBD AFT LATCH MECHANISM_ ....
_ _ _ _ _- _....... _i ,_-_ _i_ _ _ ;_ :_ -_
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS














































FAI_ C_SED, APPLIES UNTIMELY PO_R.
_AD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A17)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII9)
6) AFT AC_ATOR SYS i, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID _LAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID _LAY, K78
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
P_LAUNCH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUCT_L MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIB_TION,
CO_OSION, CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-1 ll5 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR_ICH COULD DRIVE THE STBD _IPULATOR AFT
RETENTION LATCH AC_ATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED
EVENT.
UNTIMELY AC_ATOR LATCHING COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED_ILE=PO_RWAS _BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2
COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE STBD AFT LATCH.
REFE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_ELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-ll174, SPACE S_TTLE SYSTEMS _DBOOK
r
i
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-183
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K7_
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6iC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76A118)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 1, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K73
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AIISK73
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE PORT MANIPULATOR AFT RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR
TO THE LATCH POSITION, =_
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO RELEASE THE PORT AFT LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




















REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-184
m
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K73
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS i, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K73
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8K73
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE PORT MANIPULATOR AFT
RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED
EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR LATCHING COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2
COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE PORT AFT LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-185
r
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AIT)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76A119)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 1, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K76
9)
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE STARBOARD MANIPULATOR AFT RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF'REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO RELEASE THE STBD AFT LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A17)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS i, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K76
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-I i15 VAC 400 Hz POWER TO THE
SYSTEM i MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE STARBOARD MANIPULATOR AFT
RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED
EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR LATCHING COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2
COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE STBD AFT LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-IlI74, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-187
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL _ _
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (4OV76AlI8)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 1, GND-RESET/DFACE RELAY




















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE AFT MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUI_D. ..............................
IF FAILED IN THE DEADFACE POSITION NEITHER THE LATCH OR RELEASE
FUNCTION OF THE PORT SYSTEM 1 AFT RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR COULD



















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK I
m















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76A119)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 1, GND-RESET/DFACE RELAY




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE AFT MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUIRED.
IF FAILED IN THE DEADFACE POSITION NEITHER THE LATCH OR RELEASE
FLtNCTION OF THE STBD SYSTEM 1 AFT RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR COULD
BE OPERATED. LOSS OF ABILITY TO DEADFACE IF FAILED IN THE RESET
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-189
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSyS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCHCONT_OL .........
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, sYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40_ii8)
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 3 (V54X0844E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8F8
PART NUMBER: MC451-0018-0200
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V540844E) TO MDM OF1 OR (V54X0839E) TO EVENT INDICATOR DS6 ON
PANEL A8A2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS










































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A17)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76Al19)
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 3 (V54X1044E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT





REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w



















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AI18)
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 3 (V54X0844E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8R61
PART NUMBER: RLR2002201GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
I
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LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AIIg)
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 3 (V54XI044E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII9R41
PART NUMBER: RLR2002201GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V541044E) TO MDM OF1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-193
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL ......
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 3 (V54X0844E)





















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION _ _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V540844E) TO MDM OF1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT. - .... _:_ _=
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII9)
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH SW ASSY 3 (V54XI044E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V541044E) TO MDM OF1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-195
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (40V76AII8)
AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM I, LATCH/RELEASE (K77-A3)
RESISTOR, ISOL, 1.2K OHM, 2 WATT
RESISTOR, RI4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL TO
APPROPRIATE ACTUATOR MOTOR_Y K78/K76.
LOSS OF ABILiTYTO OPERATE_PORT SYSTEM I AFT RETENTiON _
LATCH ACTUATOR TO EITHER RELEASE OR LATCH. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN
REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS









































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM i, LATCH/RELEASE (KII-A3)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL TO
APPROPRIATE ACTUATOR MOTOR RELAY K78/K76.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE STBD SYSTEM 1 AFT RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO EITHER RELEASE OR LATCH. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN
REDUNDANT SYSTEM 2 COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-ll174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
F
REPORT DATE 02/25/89 C-197
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) P.MS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (4OV76AiI8)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM i, K75 LATCHED, (V54X0864E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC A_ORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION .........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V540864E) TO MDM OA_, ....
LOSS OF MEAS_REME_
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM i, K78 LATCHED, (V54XI064E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V541064E) TO MDM OF1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-199
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4277 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, R60
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.












2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM I
AFT LATCH AC_ATOR (40V54A7) .....
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (4OV76AII8)
AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM i, K73 RELEASED,




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
BC ] cC ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AIISR60
PART NUMBER: RLR0705iOiGR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-IlI74, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
I
m












ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET










FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 1
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM i, K76 RELEASED, (V54XI074E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 1 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V541074E) TO MDM OF1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-201
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76A120)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K54
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] _ [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20K54
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE PORT FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH
pos ioN. ............................
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LATCH THE PORT FORWARD RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS













































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K54
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-3 ll5 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE PORT FWD RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1
COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE PORT FWD LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-ll174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-203
i .
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE















B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII7K56
PART _MBER: MC455-0135-0001 _
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE STARBOARD FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE
_TCH POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LATCH THE STBD FWD LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS









































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A15)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K56
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR SHICH COULD DRIVE THE STARBOARD FWD RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1
COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE STBD FWD LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO C_SE.
_D ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS T._AD: SCHMEC_EPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANI_LATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) _D LATCH AC_ATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) _D AC_ATOR SYS 2, RET.VASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID _LAY, K66
9)
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUCT_L MALF_CTION, SHOCK, VIB_TION,
CO_OSION, CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONAT_:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE PORT _D_TENTION LAT_AC_ATOR TO THE
RELEASE PosITION' _ ...........
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO RELEASE THE PORT FWD LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROC_ELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

































ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K66
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 2, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K66
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE PORT FWDRETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1
COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE STBD FWD LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-I1174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-207
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AlI7)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 2, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K44
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ] ......
LOCATION: 40V76AII7K44
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-1 ll5 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE STARBOARD FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE
RELEASE POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO RELEASE THE STBD LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 2, RE_ASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K44
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE STARBOARD FWD RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1
COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE STBD FWD LATCH.
r
w REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-209
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 2, GND RESET/DFACE RELAY















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120K68
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE FWD MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUIRED.
IF FAILED IN THE DEADFACE POSITION NEITHER THE LATCH OR RELEASE
FUNCTION OF THE PORT SYSTEM 2 FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR COULD

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-ll174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i





















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (4OV76AII7)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYS 2, GND RESET/DFACE RELAY




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE FWD MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUIRED.
IF FAILED IN THE DEADFACE POSITION NEITHER THE LATCH OR RELEASE
FUNCTION OF THE STBD SYSTEM 2 FWD RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR COULD
BE OPERATED. LOSS OF ABILITY TO DEADFACE IF FAILED IN THE RESET
POSITION.
m
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-211
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AS)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD READY-TO-LATCH ASSY I (V54X0841E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RT LS : / NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBI T: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 'FWD READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT



















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
z
m





















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (4OV76AII7)
6) FWD READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 1 (V54XI041E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 'FWD READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54XI041E) TO MDM OF4.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w













FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) FWD READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 1 (V54X0841E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 'FWD READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54X0841E) TO MDM OA2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS









































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A15)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-l (40V76AII7)
6) FWD READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 1 (V54XI041E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76Al17R34
PART NUMBER: RLR2002201GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 'FWD READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT




REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-ll174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-215
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAIL_ MODE: FAI_ OPEN.
_AD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMEC_EPER
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
i) mS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPU_TOR _TCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPU_TOR _TCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) _D _TCH AC_ATOR (40V54AS)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) _D _ADY-TO-_TCH ASSY 1 (V54X0841E)




FLIGHT P_SE HDW/F_C ABORT
P_UNCH: /NA RT_:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:













CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
WILLNOT PROVIDE _D SYSTEM 2 'FWD READY-TO-_TCH' MEAS_EMENT











_FE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROC_ELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






























FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AIS)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (4OV76AII7)
6) FWD READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 1 (V54XI041E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII7R33
PART NUMBER: RLR0701801GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 WFWD READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54X1041E) TO MDM OF4.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, LATCH/RELEASE (K68-A3)




















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL TO
THE APPROPRIATE ACTUATOR RELAY K54/K66.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE PORT SYSTEM 2 FWD RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO EITHER RELEASE OR LATCH POSITION. SUBSEQUENT
LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS



































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76Al17)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, LATCH/RELEASE (K58-A3)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL TO
THE APPROPRIATE ACTUATOR RELAY K56/K44.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE STBD SYSTEM 2 FWD RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO EITHER RELEASE OR LATCH POSITION. SUBSEQUENT
LOSS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-219
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AS)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76A120)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, K54 LATCHED, (V54X0861E)




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120R35
PART NUMBER: RLR070Si0iGR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING
















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI5)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, K56 LATCHED, (V54XI061E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII7R31
PART NUMBER: RLR0705101GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V541061E) TO MDM OF4.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-221
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AS)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, K66 RELEASED, (V54X0871E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20R34
PART NUMBER: RLR0705101GR
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING














REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) FWD LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A15)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-I (40V76AII7)
6) FWD ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, K44 RELEASED, (V54XI071E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE FWD SYSTEM 2 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V541061E) TO MDM OF4.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-IlI74, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-223
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6) ....
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MM_-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELKY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K59
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20K59
PART NUMBER: MC455-013S-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-2 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE_TE PORT MID RETENTIO_LATCH A_TUAT_TO THE LATCH
POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LATCH THE PORT MID RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






















REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-224
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76A120)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K59
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120K59
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-2 i15 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE PORT MID RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN SYSTEM 1 WOULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE PORT MID RETENTION
LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-IlI74, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4303 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K76




LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K76
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20K76
PART_BER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE STARBOARD MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE
LATCH POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LATCH THE STBD MID RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS









































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K76
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE STARBOARD MID RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN SYSTEM 1 WOULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE PORT MID RETENTION
LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL -
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 2, RE_ASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K71
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120K71
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-2 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE PORT MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE
RELEASE POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO RELEASE THE STBD MID RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS



































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 2, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K71
9)
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-2 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE PORT MID RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN SYSTEM I WOULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE PORT MID RETENTION
LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-I1174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-229
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40VS4AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 2, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K74
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20K74
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE STARBOARD MID RETENTION LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE
RELEASE POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO RELEASE THE PORT MID RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 2, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K74
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-3 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE STARBOARD MID RETENTION LATCH
ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WH!LE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD RESULT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN SYSTEM 1 WOULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE PORT MID RETENTION
LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-231
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 2, GND RESET/DFACE RELAY




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120K78
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE MID MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUIRED-= :_...... _ .........
IF FAILED IN THE DEADFACE POSITION NEITHER THE RELEASE OR
LATCH FUNCTION OF THE PORT SYSTEM 2 MID RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
l
















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40VS4AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYS 2, GND RESET/DFACE RELAY




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE MID MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUIRED
IF FAILED IN THE DEADFACE POSITION NEITHER THE RELEASE OR LATCH
FUNCTION OF THE STBD SYSTEM 2 MID RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM COULD
BE OPERATED. LOSS OF ABILITY TO DEADFACE IF FAILED IN THE RESET
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/87 C-233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS,,05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL .....
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6) _ _ .....
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER _ (MM-C)_4_'(4OV?6Ai20)
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 2 (V54X0843E)




















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 2 'MID READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54X0843E) TO MDM OF4.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS








































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 2 (V54X1043E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 2 'MID READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54XI043E) TO MDM OA3.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/87 C-235
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL _
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6) _ _
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 2 (V54X0843E)


















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSIOn, CONTAMINATION .......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 2 'MID READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(VS4X0843E) TO MDM OF4. _ _
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMs















































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76A120)
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 2 (V54XI043E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20R66
PART NUMBER: RLR2002201GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 2 'MID READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54XI043E) TO MDM OA3.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
w
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-237
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 2 (V54X0843E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_._WILL NOT opROVIDEMIDSYSTEM 2 'MID READY-TO-_TCH' MEASUREMENT


















REFE_NCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 2 (V54X1043E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120R67
PART NUMBER: RLR0701801GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 2 'MID READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54XI043E) TO MDM OA3.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-239
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL __
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20) ........
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, LATCH/RELEASE (K78-A3)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:













CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PRQVIDEM!D SYSTEM 2 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL TO
THE APPROPRIATE RELAY K76/K74. _.... _
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE PORT SYStem2 _DRETENTION _ _ _
LATCH ACTUATOR TO EITHER THE RELEASE OR LATCH POSITION.



















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
[]
D
















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, LATCH/RELEASE (K78-A3)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 2 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL TO
THE APPROPRIATE RELAY K76/K74.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE STBD SYSTEM 2 MID RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO EITHER THE RELEASE OR LATCH POSITION.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76AI20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM2, }(59 LATCHE_, (V54X0863E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120RI6
PART NUMBER: RLR0705101GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 2 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


























LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A16)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (40V76A120)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, K76 LATCHED, (V54XI063E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 2 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V54XI063E) TO MDM OA3.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEq_S HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/87 C-243
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC _
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A6) _-.................
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 (4OV76A120) ....
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, KTI RELEASED, (VS4X0873E)















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI20RI7
PART NUMBER: RLR0705i01GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 2 RELEASE MONITORING MEASUREMENT


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
B
REPORT DATE 03/02/87 C-244
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) MID LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI6)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-4 _OV76Ai20)
6) MID ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, K74 RELEASED, (V54X1073E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] e[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A120R65
PART NUMBER: RLR0705101GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE MID SYSTEM 2 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V54XI063E) TO MDM OA3.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/87 C-245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K24
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RT LS : / NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 3/ 2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE PORT AFT LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LATCH THE PORT AFT RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





































FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K24
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76A119K24
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE PORT AFT LATCH ACTUATOR TO
THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD OCCUR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT
IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE PORT AFT RETENTION LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK












ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K27
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (4OV76AII8)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K27
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-2 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE STARBOARD AFT LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE LATCH
POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LATCH THE STBD AFT RETENTION LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


































ITEM: HYBRID RELAY, K27
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A17)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-2 (4OV76AI18)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, LATCH RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K27
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-2 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE STARBOARD AFT LATCH ACTUATOR
TO THE LATCH POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD OCCUR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT
IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE STBD AFT RETENTION LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/87 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















HYBRID RELAY, KI2 .....
OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, KI2
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 1
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE PORT AFT LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE
POSITION
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO RELEASE THE PORT AFT RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
















REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-250
i
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, KI2
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII9KI2
PART NUMBER: MC455-0135-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNIIMRLY PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 1 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE PORT AFT LATCH ACTUATOR TO
THE RELEASE POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILE POWER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD OCCUR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT
IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE PORT AFT RETENTION LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/87 C-251
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















HYBRID RELAY, KI2 _ _ z
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, KI2
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORB IT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNYIMRLY PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM1 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE PORT AFT LATCH ACTUATOR TO
THE RELEASE POSITION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OC_D_ILD p0_-_S-___TORELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE COULD OC--C_. -S-UBSEQUEN_T-?AI-L_IN SYSTEM i WOULD RESULT
IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE PORT AFT RETENTION LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





















REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-251
m
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII8)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K29
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE SYSTEM 2
MOTOR TO DRIVE THE STARBOARD AFT LATCH ACTUATOR TO THE RELEASE
POSITION.
ANY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO RELEASE THE STBD AFT RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-252
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII8)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, RELEASE RELAY
7) HYBRID RELAY, 3-POLE
8) HYBRID RELAY, K29
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL PROVIDE UNTIMELY PLBM AC-I 115 VAC 400 HZ POWER TO THE
SYSTEM 2 MOTOR WHICH COULD DRIVE THE STARBOARD AFT LATCH ACTUATOR
TO THE RE_ASE PORTION AS AN UNSCHEDULED EVENT.
UNTIMELY ACTUATOR OPERATION COULD CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF
FAILURE OCCURRED WHILD P0WER WAS BEING APPLIED TO RELEASE, MOTOR
FAILURE CouLD OCCUR. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN SYSTEM 1 WOULD RESULT
IN INABILITY TO LATCH/RELEASE THE STBD AFT RETENTION LATCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AIIg)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, GND RESET/DFACE RELAY




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE AFT MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUIRED/
IF FAILED IN THE DEADFACE POSITION NEITHER THE RELEASE OR LATCH
FUNCTION OF THE PORT SYSTEM 2 AFT RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM COULD
BE OPERATED. LOSS OF ABILITY TO DEADFACE IF FAILED IN THE RESET
POSITION.
w
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-254
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL .......
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII8)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYS 2, GND RESET/DFACE RELAY















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8KI7
PART NUMBER: MC455-0128-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW RESET OR DEADFACE OF THE AFT MOTOR CONTROL
CIRCUIT AS REQUIRED/ i___......__i_ i_ _ ==
IF FAI_= IN THE DEADFACE POSITION NEITHER THE RELEASE OR LATCH
FUNCTION OF THE STBD SYSTEM 2 AFT RETENTION LATCH MECHANISM COULD





















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174; SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK I
l























FUSE, 2 AMP, F3
FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AT)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII9)
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 3, (V54X0845E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54X0845E) TO MDM OF1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-256
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT__.......






























MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL - _ _
STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A17)
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AIIS)
AFT READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 3, (V54XI045E)
FUSE, 2 AMP, (KI7-B3)
FUSE, F3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBI T: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(VS4X-OiO5E) TO MDM OA2. _
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




















































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76AII9)
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 3, (V54X0845E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AlI9R49
PART NUMBER: RLR0022201GM
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54X0845E) TO MDM OF1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-ll174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-258
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3-(40V76AII8)
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 3, (V54XI045E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT pROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54XI045E) TO MDM OA2.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





































LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76Al19)
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 3, (V54X0845E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT
(V54X0845E) TO MDM OF1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-260
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) M_PULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76AII8)_
6) AFT READY-TO-LATCH ASSY 3, (V54XI045E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 'AFT READY-TO-LATCH' MEASUREMENT

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
m
























LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (40V76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, LATCH/RELEASE (K23-A3)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL TO
THE APPROPRIATE RELAY K27/K29. .....
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE PORT SYSTEM 2 AFT RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO EITHER THE RELEASE OR LATCH POSITION.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN REDUNDANT SYSTEM 1 COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-262
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AIT)
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76AII8) _
AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, LATCH/RELEASE (KI7-A3)
RESISTOR, ISOL, 1.2K OHM, 2 WATT
RESISTOR, R3
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 LATCH/RELEASE ENABLE SIGNAL TO
THE APPROPRIATE RELAY K27/K29.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE STBD_YSTEM 2 AFT RETENTION
LATCH ACTUATOR TO EITHER THE RELEASE OR LATCH POSITION.


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
I























LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76AII9)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, K24 LATCHED, (V54X0865E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V54X0865E) TO MDM OF1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-264
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.













STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54AI7) ............
MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76AII8)
AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, K27 LATCHED, (V54X0865E)
RESISTOR, CUR LIM, 5.1K OHM, 1/4 WATT
RESISTOR, R33
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII8R33 ......
PART NUMBER: RLR0705101GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION _ .
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 LATCH ENABLE MONITORING

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
m






















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) PORT MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40VS4A7)
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76A119)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, K12 RELEASED, (V54X0875E)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76AII9R36
PART NUMBER: RLR0705101GR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOTPROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING
MEASUREMENT (V54X0875E) TO MDM OF1.
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
L
m REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-266
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RMS, 0S-6IC
2) MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL
3) STBD MANIPULATOR LATCH CONTROL, SYSTEM 2
4) AFT LATCH ACTUATOR (40V54A7) .............
5) MID MOTOR CONTROLLER (MMC)-3 (4OV76Aii8)
6) AFT ACTUATOR SYSTEM 2, K29 RELEASED, (VS4X087SE)




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT PROVIDE AFT SYSTEM 2 RELEASE ENABLE MONITORING

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS









ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: I/I




FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, STBD RMS PYRO ARM, JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AI4S21
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7254
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A OR SYSTEM B
JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS).
INABILITY TO PERFORM RMS JETTISON WHEN IT IS REQUIRED COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-268
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R


















MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL AI4
SWITCH, STBD RMS PYRO ARM, JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PR_C}{: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEO_I%BIT: /NA ATO: /NA ....
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF POWER TO ARM THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A
AND/OR SYSTEMB JETTISON/GU!LLOTINE_PICSil ....... -
WOULD REQU_OTHE_gREV_ous=o_R_SUBSEQUENT FAILURES TO'CAUSE
UNTIMELY PIC FIRING. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY OPENING CIRCUIT
BREAKERS CB27 & CB33.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: i/i




FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, PORT RMS PYRO ARM, JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A OR SYSTEM B
JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICs).
INABILITY TO PERFORM RMS JETTISON WHEN IT IS REQUIRED COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
L
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-270
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/iR




FAILS CI_OSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, PORT RMS PYRO ARM, JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOT!NE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF POWER TO ARM PORT RMS SYSTEM A AND OR
SYSTEM B JETTISON/GUILLOTiNE P!CS. _.... _ ....
WOULD REQUIRE OTHER PREVIOUS OF SUBSEQUENT FAILURES TO CAUSE
UNTIMELY PIC FIRING. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY OPENING CIRCUIT
BREAKERS CB29 AND CB32.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: i/i




FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, PYRO STBD LATCHES, AFT JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A OR SYSTEM B AFT
LATCH JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS.
INABILITY TO PERFORM RMS JETTISON WHEN IT IS REQUIRED COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-272
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
























MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL AI4
SWITCH, PYRO STBD LATCHES, AFT JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF POWER TO ACTIVATE THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A
AND/OR SYSTEM B AFT LATCH JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS.
WOULD REQUIRE OTHER PREVIOUS OR SUBSEQUENT FAILURES TO CAUSE
UNTIMELY PIC FIRING.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: i/I




FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, PYRO PORT LATCHES, AFT JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A OR SYSTEM B AFT
LATCH JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS.
INABILITY TO PERFORM RMS JETTISON WHEN IT IS REQUIRED COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-274
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR


















MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON % RETENTIONARM JETTISON
PANEL AI4
SWITCH, PYRO PORT LATCHES, AFT JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS
SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POSITION _ _.... ....
SWITCH, $32
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 36V73AI4S32
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7257
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF POWER TO ACTIVATE THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A
AND/OR_STEMB__T_H_YETTI_qSN7GUILLOTiNE PICS. ........ i_
WOULD REQUIRE OTHER PREVIOUS OR SUBSEQUENT FAILURES TO CAUSE
UNTIMELY PIC FIRING.
REFE_NcEs: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 4509 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: SWITCH, $24
FAILURE MODE: FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL AI4
SWITCH, PYRO STBD LATCHES, MID JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A OR SYSTEM B MID
LATCH JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS.
INABILITY TO PERFORM RMS JETTISON WHEN IT IS REQUIRED COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
I
,j
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-276
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R




FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, PYRO STBD LATCHES, MID JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER'LOCKED IN CENTER'POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF POWER TO ACTIVATE THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A
AND/OR SYSTEM B _TCH JETTISON/_LLg_ TINE PICS.
WOULD REQUi_HER PREVIOUS OR SUB_EQ_TZFAILURES _TO CAUSE __
UNTIMELY PIC FIRING.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I1/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: i/I




FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL A14
4) SWITCH, PYRO PORT LATCHES, MID JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTO FF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A OR SYSTEM B MID
LATCH JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS.
INABILITY TO PERFORM RMS JETTISON WHEN IT IS REQUIRED COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-278
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR


















MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL AI4
SWITCH, PYRO PORT LATCHES, MID JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM'SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS
swIT_H, 2-POLE, 3-POSITION .....
SWITCH, $31
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 36V73AI4S31
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7257
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF POWER TO ACTIVATE THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A
AND/OR SYSTEM B MID LATCH JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS.
WOULD REQUI_ OTHER PREVIOUS OR SUBSEQ_ FAILURES _TO CAUSE _
UNTIMELY PIC FIRING.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: i/I




FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, PYRO STBD LATCHES, FWD JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A OR SYSTEM B FWD
LATCH JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS.
INABILITY TO PERFORM RMS JETTISON WHEN IT IS REQUIRED COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-280
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC



















MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL AI4
SWITCH, PYRO STBD LATCHES, FWD JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS
SWITCH, _ 2-POLE, 3-POSITION
SWITCH, $23
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT......PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 36V73AI4S23
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7257
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF POWER TO ACTIVATE THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A
AND/OR SYSTEM B FWD LATCH JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS.
WOULD REQUIRE OTHER PREVIOUS OR SUBSEQUENT FAILURES TO CAUSE
UNTIMELY PIC FIRING.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: i/i




FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION_M JETTISON
PANEL AI4
SWITCH, PYRO PORT LATCHES, FWD JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TQ_ACTIV_ATETHEPORTR_SSYSTEM AOR SYSTEMB FWD ....
LATCH JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS.
INABILITY TO PERFORM RMS JETTISON WHEN IT IS REQUIRED COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-282
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R




FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, PYRO PORT LATCHES, FWD JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
U_T!MELY APPLICATIQNOFPOWE_R TO ACTIVATE_THE_ORT RMS SYSTEM A
AND/OR SYSTEM B FWD LATCH JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS.


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS














ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: i/I




FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, PYRO STBD RMS SHOULDER, JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A OR SYSTEM B
SHOULDER RETRACTOR/GUILLOTINE PICS.
INABILITY TO PERFORM RMS JETTISON WHEN IT IS REQUIRED COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-284
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R




FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL A14
4) SWITCH, PYRO STBD RMS SHOULDER, JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PKrELKU_CH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AI4S22
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7257
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF POWER TO ACTIVATE THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A
AND/OR SYSTEM B SHOULDER RETRACTOR/GUiLLOTINE PICS.
WOULD REQUIRE OTHER PREVIOUS OR SUBSEQUEN--T FAILURES TO CAUSE
UNTIMELY PIC FIRING.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
















REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-285
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 4519 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: SWITCH, $29
FAILURE MODE: FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, PYRO PORT RMS SHOULDER, JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 1/i AOA: /NA
DEORB IT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AI4S29
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7257
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A OR SYSTEM B
SHOULDER RETRACTOR/GUILLOTINE PICS.
INABILITY TO PERFORM RMS JETTISON WHEN IT IS REQUIRED COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-286
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR




FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL AI4
SWITCH, PYRO PORT RMS SHOULDER, JETTISON/SAFE/GUILLOTINE




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAF!NG: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY APPLICATION OF POWER TO ACTIVATE THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A
AND/OR SYSTEM B SHOULDER RETRACTOR/GUILLOTINE PICS.
WOULD REQUIRE OTHER PREVIOUS OR SUBSEQUENT FAILURES TO CAUSE
UNTIMELY PIC FIRING.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




























DATE: 11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3




FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER) POSITION.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL AI4
SWITCH, PORT/STBD RMS LATCHES, GROUND RESET/SAFE/DEADFACE




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PERFORM THE GROUND RESET OR DEADFACE FUNCTIONS FOR
THE RMS LATCHES.
ON-ORBIT FAILURE WOULD CAUSE INABILITY TO DEADFACE RMS LATCH
CIRCUITS PRIOR TO GUILLOTINE ACTION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-288
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R




FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY POWER.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) SWITCH, PORT/STBD RMS LATCHES, GROUND RESET/SAFE/DEADFACE
5) SWITCH, TOGGLE, HERM-SEALED, LEVER-LOCKED IN CENTER-POS





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FAILED IN GROUND RESET POSITION, NO EFFECT ON ORBIT SINCE
PRE-FLIGHT TEST VOLTAGE IS NOT APPLIED. IF FAILED IN THE _ .......
DEADFACE POSITION,-THE POWER TO THE SWITCH COULD BE REMOVED BY
OPENING SYSTEM A CIRCUIT BREAKER.
IF FAILED IN THE DEADFACE POSITION, POWER COULD BE REMOVED BY
OPENING THE SYSTEM A CIRCUIT BREAKER (PORT CB29 OR STBD CB27).
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3





LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RMS, 05-6ID
2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) PANEL AI4
4) PREFLIGHT TEST BUS POWER
5) SWITCH, PORT/STBD, RMS LATCHES, GROUND-RESET/SAFE/DEADFACE





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PROVIDE PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS VOLTAGE TO SWITCH $33
ON PANEL AI4.
INABILITY TO PERFORM GROUND RESET FUNCTION FOR RMS LATCHES. NO
EFFECT IN FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-290
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR




FAILS OPEN. WILL NOT CLOSE.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL ML 86B:D
MN A STBD PYRO JETT, SYSTEM A
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5 AMP ....
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB27
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO : /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MN A 28 VDC TO ARM THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM WOULD RESULT IN LOSSOF
POWER TO ARM THE STBD RMS SYSTEM AAND SYSTEM B
JETTiSON/GUILLOTINE PICS. LOSS OF VEHICLE/C_W COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3




FAILS CLOSED, WILL NOT OPEN.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL ML 86B:D
MN A STBD PYRO JETT, SYSTEM A
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB27
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR MN A 28 VDC THAT IS USED TO ARM
THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS
NO EFFECT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH.
i REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-I!174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-292
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR


















MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL ML 86B:D
MN B PORT PYRO JETT, SYSTEM A
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB29
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
LOSS OF MN B 28 VDC TO ARM THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B
S___flURE OF_R_DANT__WOULD RESULT iN LOSS OF
POWER TO ARM THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B
JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT_
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3




FAILS CLOSED, WILL NOT OPEN.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL ML 86B:D
MN B PORT PYRO JETT, SYSTEM A
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB29
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR MN B 28 VDC THAT IS USED TO ARM
THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS
NO EFFECT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-294
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS OPEN. WILL NOT CLOSE.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL ML 86B:D
MN C STBD PYRO JETT, SYSTEM B
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB33
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MN C 28 VDC TO ARM THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B
JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUNDANT SYSTEM WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
POWER TO ARM THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B
JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3




FAILS CLOSED, WILL NOT OPEN.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL ML 86B:D
MN C STBD PYRO JETT, SYSTEM B
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB33
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR MN C 28 VDC THAT IS USED TO ARM
THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS





REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
b
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-296
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR




FAILS OPEN. WILL NOT CLOSE.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL ML 86B:D
MN C PORT PYRO JETT, SYSTEM B
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB32
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MN C 28 VDC TO ARM THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B
JETTISON/GUILLOTINEPICS ..........
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REDUND_ SYSTEM WOULD RESULT_iN LOSS OF
POWER TO ARM THE PORT RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B
JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3




FAILS CLOSED, WILL NOT OPEN.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
PANEL ML 86B:D
MN C PORT PYRO JETT, SYSTEM B
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5 AMP
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB32
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 80V73AI80CB32
PART NUMBER: ME454-0062-2050
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR MN C 28 VDC THAT IS USED TO ARM
THE STBD RMS SYSTEM A AND SYSTEM B JETTISON/GUILLOTINE PICS
NO EFFECT. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
=
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-298
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4532 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC i
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & _TENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPU_TOR SHOULDER GUIL_LOTINE SY_STE_M B
SHOULDER GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 1
CR_TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEM B
PYRO.____ L..... _i__i_ik_i_;_i_i_#_i _i_i_z _ _!_z_
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE PORT SHOULDER CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW
JETTISON OF THE MANIPULATORARM. POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW






















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR




FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEM B
SHOULDER GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEM B
PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE STBD SHOULDER CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW
JETTISON OF THE MANIPULATORARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
u
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE sYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-300
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
























MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON &RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A
SHOULDER GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEO_B iT: /NA ATO: /_A
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI37PICI2
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A
PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE PORT SHOULDER CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW




















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPA_ SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK I
mm






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4535 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 12
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A
SHOULDER GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI38PICI2
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBDRMS SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A
PYRO.
sUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF_SYSTEMBWOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE STBD SHOULDER CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW
JETTISON OF THE MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-302
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4536 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC i, 12
FAILURE MODE: EITHER PIC 1 OR 12 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPU_TOR SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEMS A& B
SHOULDER GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC i, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA "
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 40V76A137PICI, 12
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE PORT RMS SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS
BEEN FOUND THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND UNTIMELY FIRING OF
EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE_HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH
















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK g






ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4537 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC i, 12
FAILURE MODE: EITHER PIC 1 OR 12 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEMS A & B
SHOULDER GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC I, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ]
LOCATION: 40V76A138PIC1,12
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE STBD RMS SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS
BEEN FOUND THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING ANDUNTIMELY FIRING OF
EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH
PREMATURE ARMING AND PREMATURE FIRING OF AN RMS GUILLOTINE PYRO.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE sYSTEMS _DBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/02/87 C-304
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










EITHER PIC 1 OR 12 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.











MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEMS A & B_
SHOULDER GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC l, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTO FF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION _ -.....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE STBD RMS SHOULDER GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS
BEEN FOUND-TF_AT=C-AN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND UNTIMELY FIRING OF
THE EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4538 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 6
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM B
FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE FWD LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-305
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4539 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 6
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM B
FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE FWD LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE STBD MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4540 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 17
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A
FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 17
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT : 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI37PICI7
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE FWD LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE PORT MANIPULTOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-307
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4541 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 17
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A
FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 17
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS :

















INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A PYRO. _ .... _,:_
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE FWD LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE STBD MANIPULTOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHIC_/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS










































EITHER PIC 6 OR 17 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEMS A & B




















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE PORT RMS FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A OR B COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN
FOUND THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND UNTIMELY FIRING OF
EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH
PREMATURE ARMING AND PREMATURE FIRING OF AN RMS GUILLOTINE PYRO.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
L
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-309
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4543 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 6, 17
FAILURE MODE: EITHER PIC 6 OR 17 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTIONARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEMS A & B
FWD LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC 6, 17
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBI T: 2/ 1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI38PIC6, 17
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE STBD RMS FWD LA__T_CHGUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A OR B COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SING_FAILUp_ HAS BEEN
FOUND THAT CAN CAUSE _NTIMELY_INGAND UNTIMELY FIRING OF
EITHER PIC.

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m




ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4544 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 8
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR MID LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM B
MID LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS MID LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE MID LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72"956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-311
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4545 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 8
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON &RETENTIONARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR MID LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM B
MID LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAONCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76AI38PIC8
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS MID LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE MID LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE STBD MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

































FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR MID LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A
MID LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 19
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS MID LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE MID LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-313
RINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPU_LATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR MID LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A
MID LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 19
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEO_RBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION z
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS MID LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A PYRO_ i.......I_L_ _ ........ _i_
sUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE MID LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE STBD MANIPULATORARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS














































EITHER PIC 8 OR 19 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR MID LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEMS A & B
MID LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC 8, 19
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE PORT RMS MID GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A OR
B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN
IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND UNTIMELY FIRING OF
EITHER'PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH
PREMATURE ARMING AND PREMATURE FIRING OF AN RMS GUILLOTINE PYRO.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-315
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT-










EITHER PIC 8 OR 19 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR MID LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEMS A & B
MID LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC 8, 19
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE STBD RMS MID GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A OR
B P_Q_IS COULD CAUSE LQ$S OF VEHIC_ ....NO SINGLE FAILURE _S BEEN
IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND UNTIMELY FIRING OF
EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FA_LUR_ HA_S BEEN IDE_NT!F!_D THAT ....COULD CAUSE BOTH














REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
l
I

















FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM B
AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 2/ IR AOA: /NA
DEORBI T: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE AFT LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-3i7
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4551 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC l0
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).











RMS, 05-6ID : : _
MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
PORT MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM B
AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 40V76AI38PICI0
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004




INABILITY TO ARM/FIRETHESTBD RMSAFTLATCHGUILLOTINE SYSTEM
B PyRO. _ _ _ _' _.... : :_7:11 ........... _ .........._ ....._
SUBSEQUENT ?A_LURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE AFT LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE STBD MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


















REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-318
m
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A
AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 21
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE AFT LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
L_
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-319
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).FAILS












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
PORT MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM A
AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 2 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI38PIC21
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
GUILLOTINE THE AFT LATCH CABLES WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW JETTISON OF
THE STBD MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS















REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-320
u
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















EITHER PIC l0 OR 21 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEMS A & B
AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC i0, 21
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF : /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT : 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE PORT RMS AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS
BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND UNTIMELY
FIRING OF EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH
PREMATURE ARMING AND PREMATURE FIRING OF AN RMS GUILLOTINE PYRO.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-321
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















EITHER PIC I0 OR 21 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
PORT MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEMS A & B
AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC i0, 21
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF : /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT : 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBI T: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76AI38PICI0, 21
PART _MBER: ME450-0018-0004 , _
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELYARMING/FIRING THE STBD RMS AFT LATCH GUILLOTINE SYSTEM
A 0R B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO S_NG_ FAILURE HAS
BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND UNTIMELY
FIRING OF EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH
PREMATU_ARMING_AND PREMATURE FIRING OF ANRMS GUILLOTINE PYRO.
REFERENCES: VS72"956099, ROC_ELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK









































FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR SHOULDER RETRACTOR SYSTEM B
SHOULDER RETRACTOR PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF : /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT : 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]




CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS SHOULDER RETRACTOR JETTISON
SYSTEM B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-ll174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-323
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4557 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).








2) MAN_IPU_TOR ARM/SHOULDER _0__i & R_ETENTIO_ ARM JETTISON
3) MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
4) STBD MANIPULATOR SHOULDER RETRACTOR SYSTEM B
SHOULDER RETRACTOR PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS SHOULDER RETRACTOR JETTISON
SYSTEM B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE STBD MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R




FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR SHOULDER RETRACTOR SYSTEM A
SHOULDER RETRACTOR PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS SHOULDER RETRACTOR JETTISON
SYSTEM A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-325
im
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










FAILS TO ARM AND/OR FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTi_ ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR SHOULDER RETRACTOR SYSTEM A
SHOULDER RETRACTOR PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORB IT: /NA AT O: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI38PICI3
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTs/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS SHOULDER RETRACTOR JETTISON
SYSTEM A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE STDB MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4560 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 2, 13
FAILURE MODE: EITHER PIC 2 OR 13 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR SHOULDER RETRACTOR SYSTEMS A & B
SHOULDER RETRACTOR PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC 2, 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 40V76AI37PIC2, 13
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE PORT RMS SHOULDER RETRACTOR JETTISON
SYSTEM A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE
FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND
UNTIMELY FIRING OF EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH
PREMATURE ARMING AND PREMATURE FIRING OF AN RMS PYRO.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-327
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4561 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 2, 13
FAILURE MODE: EITHER PIC 2 OR 13 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR SHOULDER RETRACTOR SYSTEMS A & B
SHOULDER RETRACTOR PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC 2, 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO : /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE STBD RMS SHOULDER RETRACTOR JETTISON
SYSTEM A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE
FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND
UNTIMELY FIRING OF EITHER PIC.
NO SIq_GLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH

















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
I















FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH BOLT SYSTEM B
FWD LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS FWD JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-329
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4563 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 7
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).









2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH BOLT SYSTEM B
FWD LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 40V76AI38PIC7
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS FWD JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




















REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-330
ni
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4564 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 18
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH BOLT SYSTEM A
FWD LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 18
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS FWD JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A PYRO ......
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-331
1INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4565 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 18
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).











RMS, 05-6ID _ _
MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH BOLTSYSTEM A ..............
FWD LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 18
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION _ _.... _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS FWD JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABIqLITY TO
JETTISON THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT,
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS





































EITHER PIC 7 OR 18 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS A & B
FWD LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC 7, 18
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE PORT RMS FWD JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE
FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND
UNTIMELY FIRING OF EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH
PREMATURE ARMING AND PREMATURE FIRING OF AN RMS PYRO.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-333
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4567 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 7, 18
FAILURE MODE: EITHER PIC 7 OR 18 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPU_TOR ARM/SHOULDER _JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR FWD LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS A & B
FWD LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR _CONTRbLLERS_(PICS)
PIC 7, 18
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS:











PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004 _ z_-
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE STBD RMS FWD JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE
FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND
UNTIMELY FIRING OF EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH













REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
g















FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR MID LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS B
MID LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS MID JETTISONLATCH BOLT
SYSTEM B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF sYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-335
MINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR MID LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS B ....
MID LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC .... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 40V76A138 PIC9
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004 _ _
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS MID JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE STBD MANIPULATORARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




































FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR MID LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS A
MID LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 20
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO : /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS MID JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS




REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-337
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).











RMS, 05-6ID i_ _ _ _
MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR MID LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS A
MID LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 2 0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 40V76AI38PIC20
PART NUMBER: ME450-00i8-0004 ....
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS MID JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE STBD MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS

































EITHER PIC 9 OR 20 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR MID LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS A & B
MID LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC 9, 20
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
















CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE PORT RMS MID JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE
FAILURE HAS BEEN _IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND
UNTIMELY FIRING OF EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH
PREMATURE _ING AND PREMA_ _F_RING OF AN RMS PYRO.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HAN_DBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-339
zI
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4573 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 9, 20
FAILURE MODE: EITHER PIC 9 OR 20 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON S_SYS LEAD: SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RMS, 05-6ID _iii.........._ _








MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR MID LATCH BOLT SYSTEM_ A& B _
MID LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC 9, 20
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_c ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRINGTHE STBD RMS MID J_ETTISON _LATCH=BQLT
SYSTEM _DDR_B_PYRD_'-COULE_UAUSE LOS_OF V_ICY_.. NO SINGL___
FAI__S_BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT CAN-CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND
UNTIMELY FIRING OF EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS _DBOOK










ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR




FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).









2) MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
3) MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS B
AFT LATCH BOLT PYRO INIT_OR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC ii
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUN C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI37PICII
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUC_L MAL_CTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS AFT JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM B PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROC_LLELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
L_ REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-341
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JE_ISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS B
AFT LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC ii
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS :
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA:
DEORBI T: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA






B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76AI38PICII
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONT_AMINATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS AFT JETTISONLATCH BOLT
SYSTEM B PYRe' ......_!_-!iii_i ...... _ _ _!i_i_i_i_ _i_=i_
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM A WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE STBD MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT ......
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK ......

































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 4576 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: PIC 22
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS A
AFT LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 22
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF : /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO : /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE PORT RMS AFT JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE PORT MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-343
.&
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ARM, FAILS TO FIRE (EITHER/BOTH).












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS A
AFT LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLER (PIC)
PIC 22
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ON'ORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 40V76A138 PIC22
PART NUMBER: ME450-0018-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ARM/FIRE THE STBD RMS AFT JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A PYRO.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SYSTEM B WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO
JETTISON THE STBD MANIPULATOR ARM. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
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ITEM: PIC Ii, 22
FAILURE MODE: EITHER PIC ii OR 22 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
PORT MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS A & B
AFT LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC ii, 22
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE PORT RMS AFT JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE
FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND
UNTIMELY FIRING OF EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH
PREMATURE ARMING AND PREMATURE FIRING OF AN RMS PYRO.
w
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-II174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 02/25/87 C-345
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















EITHER PIC Ii OR 22 ARMS/FIRES PREMATURELY.












MANIPULATOR ARM/SHOULDER JETTISON & RETENTION ARM JETTISON
MID JETTISON CONTROL CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
STBD MANIPULATOR AFT LATCH BOLT SYSTEMS A & B
AFT LATCH BOLT PYRO INITIATOR CONTROLLERS (PICS)
PIC ii, 22
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBI T: 2/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION, SHOCK VIBRATION,
CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNTIMELY ARMING/FIRING THE STBD RMS AFT JETTISON LATCH BOLT
SYSTEM A OR B PYROS COULD CAUSE Loss OF VEHICLE. NO SINGLE
FAILURE_AS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT CAN CAUSE UNTIMELY ARMING AND
UNTIMELY FIRING OF EITHER PIC.
NO SINGLE FAILURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT COULD CAUSE BOTH


















REFERENCES: VS72-956099, ROCKWELL ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC, RMS
JSC-11174, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF POSITION
CONTACTS SHORT TO GROUND WHILE
RMS IS IN USE
FAILS TO SWITCH PRIMARY POWER ON
FAILS TO SWITCH BACKUP POWER ON
PRIMARY POWER FAILS WHILE ARM
IS IN USE
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF POSITION
CONTACTS SHORT TO GROUND WHILE
RMS IS IN USE
FAILS OPEN WHILE EITHER ARM
IS IN USE
FAILS OFF WHILE ARM IS IN USE
FAILS OFF WHILE ARM IS IN USE
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO AUTO
FAILS OFF WHILE ARM IS IN USE
FAILS OFF WHILE ARM IS IN USE
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO AUTO
FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT
FAILS OPEN WHILE ARM IS IS USE
FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT
FAILS OPEN WHILE ARM IS IN USE
FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT
FAILS OPEN WHILE ARM IS IN USE
FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT
FAILS OPEN WHILE ARM IS IN USE
FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT
FAILS OPEN WHILE ARM IS IN USE
FAILS OPEN PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT
D-I
APPENDIX D (CONT'D)


























OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE
OPENS, FAILS TO CLOSE

































OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE TO EITHER
DEPLOY OR STOW
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE TO EITHER
DEPLOY OR STOW
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER _
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER)
POSITION
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER)
POSITION





























POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)

















4524 CKT BREAKER, CB27
FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER)
POSITION
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER)
POSITION
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER)
POSITION
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER)
POSITION
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER)
POSITION
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER)
POSITION
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER)
POSITION
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS LOCKED IN SAFE (CENTER)
POSITION
FAILS CLOSED, APPLIES UNTIMELY
POWER
FAILS OPEN, WILL NOT CLOSE
4526 CKT BREAKER, CB29 FAILS OPEN, WILL NOT CLOSE
4528 CKT BREAKER, CB33 FAILS OPEN, WILL NOT CLOSE





FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)





4536 PIC i, 12





4542 PIC 6, 17





4548 PIC 8, 19





4554 PIC i0, 21





POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)
FAILURE MODE
EITHER PIC 1 OR 12 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
EITHER PIC 1 OR 12 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH) =
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH) ......
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
EITHER PIC 1 OR 12 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY-
EITHER PIC 1 OR 12 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
EITHER PIC 8 OR 19 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
EITHER PIC 8 OR 19 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
EITHER PIC i0 OR 21 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
EITHER PIC i0 OR 21 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)








































































POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS (CONT'D)
FAILURE MODE
EITHER PIC 2 OR 13 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
EITHER PIC 2 OR 13 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
EITHER PIC 7 OR 18 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
EITHER PIC 7 OR 18 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
EITHER PIC 9 OR 20 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
EITHER PIC 9 OR 20 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
FAILS TO ARM AND/FAILS TO FIRE
(EITHER/BOTH)
EITHER PIC ii OR 22 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
EITHER PIC ii OR 22 ARMS/FIRES
PREMATURELY
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